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INTRODUCTION: NEW YORK CITY AS A NATIONAL MODEL
In the aftermath of Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission1 and other campaign finance decisions that have made
the regulation of money in politics more difficult, advocates of
campaign finance reform have turned to New York City as a potential
model to emulate.2 New York City’s generous public matching fund
system allows candidates to compete in elections without raising large
sums of money, and strict contribution limits—particularly for those
who do business with the City—are designed to prevent donors from
having excessive influence.3 New York City has not held major
citywide elections since 2009, however, and campaign finance law has
changed considerably since then.
The much-publicized Citizens United and its progeny, McComish
v. Bennett4 and SpeechNow.org v. Federal Election Commission,5
have been accused of opening the floodgates to unprecedented
campaign spending by outside groups. The 2012 presidential election
featured “Super PACs,” well-endowed political action committees
funded by small groups of individuals.6 These groups accounted for
nearly half of all political advertisements aired during the presidential
election, a substantially higher percentage than in past years.7 As

1. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
2. See Alec Hamilton, Campaign Finance Ruling May Make New York a Model
for the Nation, WNYC (June 21, 2011), http://www.wnyc.org/articles/its-freecountry/2011/jun/21/campaign-finance-ruling-may-make-new-york-model-nation/.
3. See Frequently Asked Questions, N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FIN. BD.,
http://www.nyccfb.info/press/info/faq.aspx (follow “How do New York City residents
benefit from the public financing of campaigns?” hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 6,
2013) (“Public financing of campaigns has several important benefits to both
candidates and taxpayers. First, it makes candidates and elected officials more
responsive to citizens, rather than to special interests, wealthy donors, and
corporations. The importance of smaller contributions is enhanced because
contributions under $175 from New York City residents become worth six times
more with public matching funds. Public financing also helps credible, often
grassroots and insurgent candidates, who may not have access to ‘big money’, run
competitive campaigns. Taxpayers are also rewarded with candidates who have more
time to reach out to voters and talk about issues, as opposed to spending their time
fundraising.”).
4. 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011).
5. 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied sub nom. Keating v. Fed. Election
Comm’n, 131 S. Ct. 553 (2010).
6. See Adam Lioz & Blair Bowie, Auctioning Democracy: The Rise of Super
PACs and the 2012 Election, DEMOS (Feb. 8, 2012), http://www.demos.org/
publication/auctioning-democracy-rise-super-pacs-and-2012-election.
7. See Domenico Montanaro, Outside Groups Make Up Almost Half of All
Presidential Campaign Ads, NBC NEWS (Sept. 17, 2012, 12:13 PM),

MARTON_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

5/27/2013 7:22 PM

NEW YORK CITY CAMPAIGN FINANCE

675

New York City proceeds towards the 2013 municipal elections, it will
not only elect a new mayor for the first time since 2001, but will also
replace many of its citywide office-holders, borough presidents and
local council members because of term limits.8 Given the stakes, New
York City’s campaign financing system will likely be tested by the
infusion of significant third-party spending.
The New York City Campaign Finance Board’s (CFB) reflective
report on the 2009 city elections anticipated the different playing field
that unlimited independent expenditures would create in 2013,
observing that “[i]ndependent expenditures are of particular concern
in jurisdictions with public financing programs, because those
candidates who agree to limit their spending are faced by
independent expenditure committees without limits.”9 Even before
Citizens United, independent expenditures had increased significantly
during the City’s previous two election cycles.10 Campaign finance
reformers should watch to see whether such a model can survive in
the post-Citizens United legal and political landscape. Given the
explosion of outside spending during the 2012 Republican
presidential nomination, the Scott Walker recall election in

http://firstread.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/09/17/13917146-outside-groups-make-upalmost-half-of-all-presidential-campaign-ads?lite; Alina Selyukh, Study of US
Campaign Ads Finds Growing Role of Outside Groups, REUTERS (Sept. 13, 2012),
http://in.reuters.com/article/2012/09/12/usa-campaign-moneyidINL1E8KCE8720120912.
8. See David Chen, Some Candidates Get Early Start on Fund-Raising for 2013,
N.Y. TIMES (July 11, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/12/nyregion/new-yorkcandidates-get-early-start-on-fund-raising-for-2013.html. The 2013 election marks a
major moment of political transition for New York City. Shortly after the City
Charter overhaul of 1989, an independent effort spearheaded by Ronald Lauder led
to the passage of term limits. This forced dozens of elected officials from office in
2001. Many of the political generation that replaced them in the City Council and
borough president’s offices served concurrently with Mayor Bloomberg, who led an
effort to alter the City Charter to allow himself a third term in 2009. The 2013
election will likely yield New York City a new mayor, public advocate, comptroller,
several new borough presidents, a new council speaker, and usher in at least two
dozen councilmembers.
9. N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FIN. BD., NEW YORKERS MAKE THEIR VOICES HEARD: A
REPORT ON THE 2009 ELECTIONS 166 (2010) (quoting PAUL RYAN, A STATUTE OF
LIBERTY: HOW NEW YORK CITY’S CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW IS CHANGING THE FACE
OF LOCAL ELECTIONS 42 (2003)), available at http://www.nyccfb.info/PDF/
per/2009_PER/2009PostElectionReport.pdf.
10. See Joseph P. Parkes, Disclosing Independent Expenditures, GOTHAM
GAZETTE (Feb. 6, 2012, 4:35 PM), http://www.gothamgazette.com/index.php/
archives/853-disclosing-independent-expenditures-.
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Wisconsin, and the 2012 presidential election, they have reason to be
nervous.11
If the New York City model is to be the standard-bearer for the
nation, then there are issues beyond whether it can properly
withstand the influence of outside spending. Even though the public
matching fund system is credited with increasing and diversifying
small donor participation, special interest groups like the real estate
lobby and unions play outsized roles in funding local campaigns, and
are already significantly impacting the 2013 election. There are
questions concerning whether candidates are sufficiently deterred
from coordinating with outside parties, whether public matching
funds are used properly, and whether a sophisticated campaign
finance program has significantly altered the quality or even the
composition of individuals holding elected office in New York City.
This Article will focus on the strengths and weaknesses of the New
York City campaign finance system as it enters its first post-Citizens
United election cycle. Part I of the Article recounts the origin and
evolution of New York City’s CFB, which has regulated elections in
New York City since 1989, and discusses early developments in New
York City’s campaign finance law. Part II analyzes Citizens United
and other significant campaign finance reform cases that have been
decided since New York City’s 2009 elections, with an emphasis on
the decisions’ potential impacts on New York City and the measures
that New York City has taken in response. Part III takes a look at the
major players in the 2013 election and determines whether these
candidates have benefitted from the recent developments in
campaign finance law. Finally, Part IV addresses whether the system
is properly regulated, and to what extent its shortcomings can be
remedied. If New York City is to serve as a model campaign finance
reform system, advocates seeking to adopt it elsewhere should
consider the strengths of the system worth emulating, the
shortcomings that need correcting, and the challenges inherent to the
intersection of money and politics.

11. See generally R. Sam Garrett, “Super PACs” in Federal Elections: Overview
Issues for Congress, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. (Dec. 2, 2011),
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42042.pdf; Andy Kroll, 10 Numbers You Need to
Know on Scott Walker Recall Day, MOTHER JONES, (June 5, 2012),
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/06/top-10-wisconsin-scott-walker-recall;
Mad Money: TV Ads in the 2012 Presidential Campaign, WASH. POST (Nov. 14,
2012),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/politics/track-presidentialcampaign-ads-2012/; Montanaro, supra note 7.

and
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I. THE RULES OF THE GAME: THE ORIGINS OF THE NEW YORK
CITY PUBLIC MATCHING FUND SYSTEM12
During the 1980s, New York City became embroiled in a political
scandal that shook the City’s ruling class. Donald Manes, the
powerful Queens Borough President, was investigated by the FBI for
selling Parking Violations Bureau contracts to companies in exchange
for kickbacks.13 Manes committed suicide as the charges against him
mounted, but there was also sufficient evidence to charge one of his
accomplices, Bronx Borough President Stanley Friedman.14 At the
same time, Brooklyn Borough President Meade Esposito resigned
over charges concerning illegal influence peddling, including illegal
benefits conferred upon Bronx Congressman Mario Biaggi.15
Although Mayor Ed Koch was not accused of wrongdoing, he was
politically embarrassed when officials he had appointed as a political
favor to Esposito were brought down in the scandal.16 Finally, the
vehicle for the Borough Presidents’ power, the Board of Estimate,
was struck down in court.17
The Board of Estimate had represented a unique governing
structure for a large city like New York. The eight members of the
Board included the five borough presidents, each of whom had one
vote, along with the mayor, city council president, and comptroller,
who each had two votes.18 The Board of Estimate had enormous
zoning, contracting, and budgeting powers, which meant an alliance
of borough presidents could effectively control which companies had
access to the City. Staten Island had as much clout on the Board as
the far more populous Brooklyn.19 The structure was challenged on

12. For an extremely thorough summary of New York City’s campaign finance
laws, see JERRY GOLDFEDER, MONEY AND POLITICS (2012). This short book is a
step-by-step guide for candidates to navigate New York City’s campaign finance
system, though it concludes that hiring counsel might be a sound investment.
13. Seth Faison, 80s Scandal Unraveled in a Suicide Note, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19,
1993,
http://www.nytimes.com/1993/08/19/nyregion/80-s-scandal-unraveled-in-asuicide.html. A more detailed account of the scandal is covered in WAYNE BARRETT
& JACK NEWFIELD, CITY FOR SALE: ED KOCH AND THE BETRAYAL OF NEW YORK
(1988).
14. Faison, supra note 13.
15. Richard Lyons, Meade Esposito, 86, Former Power in Politics, Is Dead, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 4, 1993, http://www.nytimes.com/1993/09/04/obituaries/meade-esposito86-former-power-in-politics-is-dead.html.
16. Id.
17. Bd. of Estimate v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688, 690–91 (1989).
18. Id. at 694.
19. Id. at 702 (citing Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 579 (1964)).
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the grounds that it violated the “one person, one vote” principle
established in Reynolds v. Sims. The United States Supreme Court’s
unanimous decision declaring the Board of Estimate unconstitutional
on the heels of the Manes, Friedman, and Esposito scandals gave
reformers an opportunity to restructure local governance. In 1989,
voters approved the largest overhaul of the City Charter since 1898,
when New York became the five boroughs it is today.20
The new City Charter addressed the corruption scandals of the
1980s by all but eliminating the power of borough presidents, who
retained minimal zoning powers, and significantly expanding the
power of the mayor and city council; the latter expanded to its
present-day 51 members to increase the potential for racial diversity.
The new charter also created the nebulous position of public
advocate, which joined the mayor and comptroller as a citywide
elected position.
Another legislative response to the 1980s scandals was the 1988
adoption of the Campaign Finance Act.21 The legislation created the
New York City CFB, an independent and nonpartisan entity charged
with generating local campaign finance laws and regulating
compliance with them.22 The CFB oversees a campaign finance
system that imposes disclosure requirements and individual
contribution limits on all candidates, and limitations on total
contributions and spending for candidates seeking pubic matching
funds.23 Originally, “the city’s primary goal for the public finance
system [was] to limit the influence of money in citywide elections,” a
position the CFB no longer holds in light of Citizens United,
discussed infra.24
20. See Alan Finder, The 1989 Elections: Charter; Overhaul of New York City
Charter Is Approved, Polls Show, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1989,
http://www.nytimes.com/1989/11/08/nyregion/1989-elections-charter-overhaul-newyork-city-charter-approved-polls-show.html.
21. See generally N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 3-701 (2012).
22. The first Campaign Finance Board was chaired by Fordham University
President Father Joseph O’Hare, and included among its five board members an
attorney from the law firm of Pavia and Harcourt, Sonia Sotomayor. N.Y.C.
CAMPAIGN FIN. BD., WINDOWS OF OPPORTUNITY: CAMPAIGN FINANCE AND THE NEW
CITY COUNCIL (1992), available at http://www.nyccfb.info/PDF/per/92_PER-introch.2.pdf.
23. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 3-718 (2012). Interestingly, state law theoretically
preempts the New York City laws as they apply to the voluntary system’s nonparticipants. See GOLDFEDER, supra note 12, at 13 n.2.
24. Larry Levy & Andrew Rafalaf, High Court’s Recent Decision on Public

Matching Funds Renders New York City’s Campaign Finance System Ripe for
Constitutional Attack, ALBANY GOV’T L. REV. ONLINE (July 11, 2011),
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The public matching fund program was the centerpiece of the
voluntary program. Initially, the city matched contributions at a 1:1
ratio for the first $1,000 contributed by each New York City
resident.25 Eligibility was contingent on raising a certain number of
donations and donors from the district where the election was taking
place, and total matching funds were capped at 50% of the total
expenditure limits.26 The eligibility requirements and cap have
remained largely intact, but during the 2001, 2003, and 2005 elections,
the first $250 were matched at a ratio of 4:1.27 The 1998 law that
expanded the matching ratio to 4:1 also introduced the “bonus”
matching funds, which increased the ratio of matching funds for
participating candidates who faced well-financed opponents who
spent beyond the CFB voluntary limit.28 During the 2009 election the
ratio was changed to 6:1 for the first $175 of a contribution, and that
ratio remains in effect for the 2013 election.29
By lowering the amount of money that is matched and increasing
the degree to which it is matched, the system is designed to encourage
more small donor participation.30 One analysis suggests, “the
incentive for candidates to recruit small donors has increased the
http://www.aglr.wordpress.com/2011/07/11/high-courts-recent-decision-on-publicmatching-funds-renders-new-york-citys-campaign-finance-system-ripe-forconstitutional-attack. Today, the CFB’s mission is described as follows: “The CFB’s
mission is to increase voter participation and awareness, provide campaign finance
information to the public, enable more citizens to run for office, strengthen the role
of small contributors, and reduce the potential for actual or perceived corruption.”
Welcome to the Campaign Finance Board, N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FIN. BD.,
http://www.nyccfb.info (last visited Mar. 6, 2013).
25. 2 N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FIN. BD., ON THE ROAD TO REFORM: CAMPAIGN FINANCE
IN THE 1993 NEW YORK CITY ELECTIONS, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2 (1994), available at
http://www.nyccfb.info/PDF/per/94_PER_execsumm.pdf.
Interestingly, the CFB
report highlighted the municipal unions, the United Federation of Teachers union
and the Real Estate Board of New York as the three largest donors to 1993
candidates. Id. at 7 tbl.2. Twenty years later, all three entities retain prominent roles
in the landscape of local campaign spending.
26. See id. at 3.
27. Michael J. Malbin, Peter W. Brusoe & Brendan Glavin, Small Donors, Big
Democracy: New York City’s Matching Funds as a Model for the Nation and States,
11 ELECTION L.J. 3, 9 (2012), available at http://www.cfinst.org/pdf/state/NYC-as-aModel_ELJ_As-Published_March2012.pdf.
28. 1998 N.Y.C. Local Law No. 48 (codified as amended at N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE
§ 3-703 (2012)).
29. Id.
30. See Malbin et al., supra note 27, at 19. The CFB’s auditing of the matching
fund process is rigorous; during the 2009 election cycle the CFB denied almost twenty
percent of matching fund requests on the grounds that they violated a condition of
eligibility. GOLDFEDER, supra note 12, at 26.
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number of donors who give, as well as the diversity of the census
block groups in which they reside.”31 Another report explained,
“What differentiates New York’s program is that it looks to level the
playing field less between candidates and more between donors.”32
With the demise of “trigger-fund” public financing systems following
the Supreme Court’s ruling in McComish v. Bennett, New York
City’s campaign financing system is increasingly being discussed as a
Recently, good
model for jurisdictions across the country.33
government groups and other advocates have pushed for the New
York City model to be adopted at the state level.34
II. CAMPAIGN FINANCE JURISPRUDENCE AND NEW YORK CITY
A. Citizens United and New York City’s Response
Few cases in recent years, and certainly no campaign finance
reform case, have garnered as much attention as Citizens United v.
Federal Election Commission.35 What began as an innocuous case
about whether a “documentary” about Hillary Clinton, Hillary: The
Movie, could be aired on television within thirty days of a Democratic
presidential primary election, morphed into the definitive case on the
limits of First Amendment speech in the campaign context.36
Overruling Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce and
invalidating sections of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002
(BCRA),37 the Court, in an opinion written by Justice Anthony
Kennedy, held that “[g]overnment may not suppress political speech
on the basis of the speaker’s corporate identity,”38 and that “[n]o
sufficient governmental interest justifies limits on the political speech
of nonprofit or for-profit corporations.”39 Detailed analysis of the
holding in Citizens United and debate over whether the case was

31. Malbin et al., supra note 27, at 17.
32. Hamilton, supra note 2.
33. Id.
34. Thomas Kaplan, Wealthy Group Seeks to Reform Election Giving in New
York, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/12/nyregion/
coalition-urges-public-financing-in-new-york-state-elections.html.
35. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
36. Id.
37. Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002). This legislation was also commonly
known as “McCain-Feingold” for its sponsors in the United States Senate, John
McCain (R-Arizona) and Russ Feingold (D-Wisconsin).
38. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 365.
39. Id.
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correctly decided would merit its own law review article, and indeed
has,40 but its main implications were two-fold.
Legally, the decision established that the government could not
articulate an anti-corruption principle with respect to noncoordinated independent expenditures.41 Because the Court rejected
the anti-distortion principle used to justify limiting independent
corporate expenditures in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of
Commerce, corruption or the appearance of corruption were the only
grounds under which the government could restrict First Amendment
political speech. The Court could not, however, identify a sufficient
government interest in reducing corruption or the appearance of
corruption absent a quid pro quo exchange. While such an exchange
could be inferred by a direct contribution to a candidate, the Court
did not recognize the danger of a quid pro quo exchange by
independent spending.42 The Court’s sweeping view of the First
Amendment and the rights it conferred on corporations and unions
opened the door to challenges against many federal and local
campaign finance reform laws. Importantly, however, the Court
pointedly did not apply this expansive reasoning to direct
contributions.43 The Court also upheld the constitutionality of
disclosure requirements, even for independent expenditures.44
The second major implication of Citizens United was its cultural
impact, as the decision became a quasi-partisan political flashpoint.
To some, Citizens United “opened the floodgates” to corporations
buying elections, thereby undermining democracy.45 The trouble with

40. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, Corporations, Corruption, and Complexity:
Campaign Finance after Citizens United, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 643 (2011);
Anne Tucker, Flawed Assumptions: A Corporate Law Analysis of Free Speech and
Corporate Personhood in Citizens United, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 497 (2010);
Molly J. Walker Wilson, Too Much of a Good Thing: Campaign Speech After
Citizens United, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2365 (2010); Monica Youn, First Amendment
Fault Lines and the Citizens United Decision, 5 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 135 (2011).
41. Citizens United, 558 U.S. 359–60.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 359 (“Citizens United has not made direct contributions to candidates,
and it has not suggested that the Court should reconsider whether contribution limits
should be subjected to rigorous First Amendment scrutiny.”).
44. Id. at 366 (“Disclaimer and disclosure requirements may burden the ability to
speak, but they ‘impose no ceiling on campaign-related activities’ . . . .” (citation
omitted)).
45. See Anjeanette Damon, Citizens United Didn’t Just Open Up Money
LAS
VEGAS
SUN,
July
15,
2012,
Floodgates
for
Corporations,
http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2012/jul/15/citizens-united-didnt-just-open-moneyflood-gates-/; Sean Siperstein, Citizens United v. We the People, HUFFINGTON POST
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this rhetoric is that wealthy donors, corporations and unions had little
difficulty spending large sums of money in prior elections, however
easier the Citizens United decision made it. To the persons who
sought to spend large amounts of money in elections and their
supporters, Citizens United was a First Amendment triumph that
validated their behavior.46 From this point of view, big money in
politics was no longer sleazy—it was justified under the Constitution.
The emergence of Charles and David Koch,47 Foster Friess,48 and
Sheldon Adelson,49 billionaires who spent lavishly during the 2012
presidential elections, may have been in part due to their assurance
that the act of spending millions of dollars on electoral politics was
legal under a recent Supreme Court decision. Such legitimized
meddling has also come to the New York area; in a 2012 Long Island
Congressional race, a Super PAC bankrolled by a hedge fund focused
on rolling back Dodd-Frank financial regulations spent almost
$300,000 in an unsuccessful effort to defeat the incumbent
Democrat.50
In a metropolis like New York City, full of wealthy individuals and
powerful corporations, any cultural shift toward a politics more
permissive of unfettered campaign spending could be dangerous. As
then-mayoral candidate Rudy Giuliani testified at a Campaign
Finance Board hearing in 1991, “[I]t is demonstrable that . . . very,
very often over the last ten to fifteen years . . . public officials in New
York City were incapable of making decisions in the public interest
because of the effects of money and the huge amounts donated by

(Jan. 20, 2012, 12:35 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sean-siperstein/citizensunited-v-we-the-_b_1219221.html; Jules Witcover, Supreme Court Contempt, CHI.
TRIB., June 27, 2012, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-06-27/news/sns201206261500--tms--poltodayctnyq-a20120627-20120627_1_montana-supreme-courtpacs-campaigns.
46. See John Nolte, Why the Media Hates and Fears Super PACs, BREITBART
(June 12, 2012), http://www.breitbart.com/Big-Journalism/2012/06/12/Why-MSMHates-SuperPACs.
47. Matt Bai, How Much Has Citizens United Changed the Political Game?, N.Y.
TIMES, July 17, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/22/magazine/how-much-hascitizens-united-changed-the-political-game.html.
48. Jim Rutenberg & Nicholas Confessore, A Wealthy Backer Likes the Odds on
Santorum, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 8, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/09/
us/politics/foster-friess-a-deep-pocketed-santorum-super-pac-backer.html.
49. Editorial, In Thrall to Sheldon Adelson, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/17/opinion/in-thrall-to-sheldon-adelson.html.
50. Rachael Marcus & Michael Beckel, House Candidates Fear Super PACs,
CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Sept. 13, 2012), http://www.publicintegrity.org/2012/09/13/
10859/house-candidates-fear-super-pacs.
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some.”51 The Citizens United Court likely would respond that
Giuliani’s concerns were properly addressed by the Court’s decision
to maintain the distinction between contributions and independent
expenditures drawn in Buckley v. Valeo.52 To Justice Kennedy, a
“huge” contribution to a campaign account might leave open the
possibility of corruption, but a “huge” independent expenditure could
not, because it lacked a “quid pro quo” element.53
The CFB wasted no time in responding to the Citizens United
decision. The same day the decision was handed down, CFB
Executive Director Amy Loprest issued a statement noting that the
decision involved independent expenditures, and did not change the
law with respect to direct contributions.54 In a nod to a part of the
Citizens United decision that expounded on disclosure
requirements,55 the statement also vowed to enhance disclosure
requirements through the New York Campaign Finance Act.56
The ensuing political dialogue led the City Charter Revision
Commission to place an amendment to the City Charter on the 2010
ballot.57 New Yorkers would vote on requiring the “public disclosure
of independent expenditures made ‘to influence the outcome of a city
election or referendum.’”58 The CFB backed this “Independent
Expenditure Amendment.” The issue was bundled with several
others as a single referendum on revising the City Charter. Despite
its complexity, the amendment passed easily, eighty-three to

51. Nicole A. Gordon & Hyla Pottharst Wagner, The New York City Campaign
Finance Program: A Reform That Is Working, 19 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 605, 607
(1991), available at http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1553
&context=ulj.
52. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
53. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 359 (2010) (citing
McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 296–98 (2003) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
54. Press Release, N.Y.C. Campaign Fin. Bd., Statement of CFB Executive
Director Amy Loprest on the U.S. Supreme Court Ruling in Citizens United v. FEC
(Jan. 21, 2010), available at http://www.nyccfb.info/press/news/press_releases/201001-21.pdf.
55. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 366 (“Disclaimer and disclosure requirements
may burden the ability to speak, but they ‘impose no ceiling on campaign-related
activities’ . . . .” (citation omitted)).
56. Press Release, supra note 54.
57. Charter Revision Ballot Questions, N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FIN. BD.,
http://www.nyccfb.info/public/voter-guide/general_2010/ballotProposal.aspx
(last
visited Mar. 6, 2013).
58. Parkes, supra note 10.
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seventeen percent.59 CFB Spokesman Eric Friedman explained that
the purpose of the new law was to close the “disclosure gap” and
allow voters to identify candidates’ supporters.60
In March 2011, the CFB began hearings on how to draft effective
regulations under the Independent Expenditure Amendment. In
their testimony before the CFB’s hearing on “Promulgating Rules for
the Disclosure of Independent Expenditures,” Ciara Torres-Spelliscy
and Mark Ladov highlighted the Supreme Court’s strong defense of
disclosure in recommending that the CFB adopt an expansive
disclosure policy:
In fact, while invalidating longstanding restrictions on corporate
political spending, the Court’s recent Citizens United decision
reaffirmed that disclosure and disclaimer requirements for political
advertisements are presumptively valid. In doing so, eight Justices
agreed that “[d]isclaimer and disclosure requirements . . . impose no
ceiling on campaign-related activities, and do not prevent anyone
from speaking.” And, the Court went on to praise transparency of
money in politics, explaining: “The First Amendment protects
political speech; and disclosure permits citizens and shareholders to
react to the speech of corporate entities in a proper way. This
transparency enables the electorate to make informed decisions and
give proper weight to different speakers and messages.” This
holding in Citizens United echoes the holding in the earlier
McConnell decision where eight of nine Justices also embraced
robust disclosure for electioneering communications.61

As the disclosure amendment wound its way through the rulemaking process, the CFB and other reform proponents sought to
make it as robust as possible. That meant crafting a rule broad
enough to require disclosure from third parties participating in the
election, whether or not they explicitly used specific terms to
advocate for or against certain candidates. CFB Chairman Father
Joseph Parkes wrote,

59. Javier Hernandez, Once Again, Voters Approve Term Limits, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 3, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/03/nyregion/03limits.html.
60. Nathaniel Herz, Campaign Finance Board Clamps Down on Super PAC-Style
Spending, N.Y. WORLD (Mar. 26, 2012), http://www.thenewyorkworld.com/
2012/03/26/city-campaign-finance-board-clamps-down-on-super-pac-style-spending/.
61. Testimony of Ciara Torres-Spelliscy & Mark Ladov, Counsel, Brennan Ctr.’s
Democracy Program, to N.Y.C. Campaign Fin. Bd., Hearing on Promulgating Rules
for the Disclosure of Independent Expenditures (Mar. 10, 2011) (footnotes omitted)
(quoting Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 366, 371 (2010)),
available at http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/NYC%20CFB%
20Testimony%20Torres-Spelliscy%20and%20Ladov%20March%2010%202011.pdf.
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For disclosure to be meaningful, it should be as inclusive as
possible. Voters who pay attention during election season know
that most campaign messages do not rely on straightforward words
like “vote for” or “defeat.” Disclosure requirements limited only to
expenditures for messages like these that constitute “express
advocacy” would keep most independent political spending in the
dark.
Our proposed rules take a more realistic view. Though it may
mention a public policy issue, a mailing sent before an election
declaring that “Candidate X is extremely out of touch with New
York City” or “Candidate Y is wrong for Brooklyn” may have no
reasonable interpretation other than as an attempt to influence the
outcome. These are effective campaign messages. In many cases,
they are written to evade the express advocacy standard and escape
scrutiny. Any meaningful disclosure requirement would allow the
public to see which interests are paying to broadcast them.62

The effectiveness of such a broad definition of campaign advocacy
is clear. The federal courts have struggled over “magic words” that
made a message cross the line from educational to express advocacy.63
Under the new CFB rules, any campaign message with the intent or
effect of helping or hurting a candidate would fall within the
disclosure requirement. Parkes continued by explaining,
Any voter will be able to go online and view financial information
for city candidates and the independent groups who support or
oppose them in a single place. In the next mayoral election, New
Yorkers can trust that all spending by and for the candidates will
happen in public view.64

Indeed, spending a mere $100 puts an outside entity into this
disclosure regime,65 so the CFB is unlikely to let any significant
outside group slip through the cracks. As with any disclosure regime,
its effectiveness will be based on whether the public utilizes the vast
wealth of information these disclosures will provide. Given the
extensive political coverage of New York City politics through its

62. Parkes, supra note 10.
63. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44 n.52 (1976) (per curiam) (“This construction
would restrict the application of § 608(e)(1) to communications containing express
words of advocacy of election or defeat, such as ‘vote for,’ ‘elect,’ ‘support,’ ‘cast your
ballot for,’ ‘Smith for Congress,’ ‘vote against,’ ‘defeat,’ ‘reject.’”).
64. Parkes, supra note 10.
65. See N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FIN. BD., GUIDE TO THE CFB INDEPENDENT
EXPENDITURE DISCLOSURE RULES 2 (2010), available at http://www.nyccfb.info/
PDF/rulemaking/Independent-Expenditures-Guidance.pdf.
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newspapers, blogs, and good government groups, one can expect that
any significant independent political spending in the 2013 election
cycle will come to light.
The specific guidelines regulating the CFB’s disclosure goals are
laid out in Board Rule 1-08(f).66 The new rules require disclosure of
whether a third party has any relationship with the candidate’s
campaign, or whether an expenditure was made in coordination with
the candidate’s campaign.67 The CFB’s definition of coordination is
itself quite extensive, a response to the ever-graying area in federal
law. The rule even specifically requires disclosure of whether rental
space is shared, perhaps made explicit in light of the Working
Families Party and Service Employees International Union (SEIU)
previously having been found to conduct campaign activities at the
same address as City Council campaigns.68
At the federal level, the line between lawmakers and the PACs
that spend “independently” on their behalf is already incredibly
blurred.69 The CFB’s commitment to rigorously preventing sham
independent groups from skirting campaign finance laws is
particularly important given the track record of federal coordination
laws. A recent Fifth Circuit decision, Federal Election Commission v.
Cao, defined coordination so narrowly that any sophisticated political
actor could avoid running afoul of the law with the slightest bit of
foresight.70
During the 2012 presidential election campaign,
surrogates and fundraisers from the candidates’ campaigns and
outside groups mingled and spoke at each other’s events.71 The CFB

66. N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FIN. BD. R. 1-08(f) (2010).
67. N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FIN. BD. R. 1-08(f)(i)–(vi) (2010).
68. N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FIN. BD. R. 1-08(f)(vi) (2010); see N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FIN.
BD., CAMPAIGN FINANCE BOARD FINAL AUDIT REPORT OF FRIENDS OF ANNABEL
PALMA (2007) [hereinafter ANNABEL PALMA FINAL AUDIT], available at
http://www.nyccfb.info/reports/FA_pdf/FA-2003-apalma-767.pdf.
69. Jake Sherman, John Bresnahan & Kenneth Vogel, A Super PAC-Politician
Firewall? Not Quite, POLITICO (Aug. 23, 2012), http://www.politico.com/news
/stories/0812/79854.html.
70. See In re Cao, 619 F.3d 410 (5th Cir. 2010); see also Evan Palenschat,
Campaign Finance Reform in the Post-Citizens United Era (Part 1), N.Y. CIVIC
(Apr. 10, 2012), http://nycivic.org/story/campaign-finance-reform-post-citizensunited-era. The easiest way for candidates to circumvent the federal policy is to have
trusted proxies, such as former chiefs of staff, leave their campaigns shortly before
elections to run parallel campaign operations under liberated PAC guidelines.
71. Eliza Newlin Carney, The Super PAC Paradox, ROLL CALL (Mar. 12, 2012),
http://www.rollcall.com/issues/57_107/Super-PAC-Paradox-213021-1.html;
David
Dayen, Super PAC Organizer Rove to Speak at Candidate Romney’s Donor Event,

MARTON_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

5/27/2013 7:22 PM

NEW YORK CITY CAMPAIGN FINANCE

687

hoped to have records of independent expenditures made by third
parties available by the fall of 2012.72 A special election for Bronx
City Council District Twelve in November 2012 was the first election
for which the disclosure rules applied.73
A relatively small
expenditure from the SEIU on behalf of the eventual winner, Andy
King, became the first expenditure disclosed under the CFB’s new
system.74
B.

SpeechNow.org v. F.E.C. and the Rise of Super PACs

Citizens United’s legal impact was immediate. SpeechNow.org v.
Federal Election Commission, which the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit decided less than two
months after Citizens United, truly opened the floodgates to
unlimited spending by independent parties.75 SpeechNow.org is a
front group for the conservative anti-tax organization Club for
Growth.76 Claiming its purpose was solely to make independent
expenditures, not direct contributions to campaigns, in 2007
SpeechNow.org sought to retain nonprofit status and receive
unlimited contributions from individuals without filing as a political
action committee.77 The Federal Election Commission (FEC) was
unable to provide SpeechNow.org with an advisory opinion, as it
lacked the number of members to issue advisory opinions at the
time.78 In 2008, SpeechNow.org filed in the District Court for the
District of Columbia, claiming that it was a violation of its First
Amendment rights and the rights of its donors to be subjected to

FIREDOGLAKE (June 21, 2012, 1:41 PM), http://news.firedoglake.com/2012/06/21/
superpac-organizer-rove-to-speak-at-candidate-romneys-donor-event/.
72. Email from Eric Friedman, Dir. of External Affairs, N.Y.C. Campaign Fin.
Bd., to author (Aug. 3, 2012, 3:36 PM EST).
73. Id. The election is to fill the vacancy left by Councilmember Larry Seabrook,
who was convicted of fraud. See Aaron Edwards, Possible Candidates for Seabrook’s
City Council Seat Emerge, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com
/2012/07/28/nyregion/challengers-to-succeed-seabrook-on-city-council-emerge.html.
74. Celeste Katz, Race to Replace Larry Seabrook a Test Case for New OutsideN.Y.
DAILY
NEWS,
Oct.
26,
2012,
Spending
Report
Rules,
http://www.nydailynews.com/blogs/dailypolitics/2012/10/race-to-replace-larryseabrook-a-test-case-for-new-outside-spending-report-rul.
75. SpeechNow.org v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
76. Lisa Graves & Brendan Fischer, Millionaire Insiders Hide Behind Group
Attacking Feingold, CTR. FOR MEDIA & DEMOCRACY (Oct. 26, 2010),
http://www.prwatch.org/node/9559.
77. SpeechNow.org v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 567 F. Supp. 2d 70 (D.D.C. 2008).
78. SpeechNow.org, 599 F.3d at 690.
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registration, reporting requirements, and contribution limits.79
Applying intermediate scrutiny, the District Court upheld the
contribution and reporting requirements for non-profits, holding that
such organizations were “uniquely positioned to serve as conduits for
corruption both in terms of the sale of access and the circumvention
of the soft money ban.”80
While the case was on appeal to the D.C. Circuit, however, the
Supreme Court handed down Citizens United. In light of that
decision, SpeechNow.org argued that the FEC could no longer argue
that independent expenditures raised corruption or appearance of
corruption concerns. It stood to follow that contributions to
organizations making independent expenditures could not do so,
either. The D.C. Circuit largely agreed, holding that contribution
limits on entities making contributions to organizations engaged only
in independent expenditures was unconstitutional.81
Thus,
individuals, corporations, unions, and other entities were able to give
unlimited amounts to PACs, creating so-called “Super PACs.”82
More nefariously, in the view of campaign finance reformers,
nonprofit 501(c)(4) groups that were not subject to reporting
requirements could also raise funds through anonymous donors and
then donate them to PACs, creating a subterfuge that defeated the
purpose of PAC reporting requirements.83 The D.C. Circuit did,
however, uphold disclosure requirements, finding that “the public has
an interest in knowing who is speaking about a candidate and who is
funding that speech,” and that disclosure requirements “deter[] and
help[] expose violations of other campaign finance restrictions, such
as those barring contributions from foreign corporations or
individuals.”84
The close relationship between 501(c)(4)s, PACs, and candidates
could prove problematic for those seeking to limit special interest
influences in New York City. Even though the CFB has moved to

79. SpeechNow.org, 567 F. Supp. 2d at 73.
80. Id. at 79 (internal quotation marks omitted).
81. SpeechNow.org, 599 F.3d at 690.
82. The Court’s decision was clarified by the Federal Election Commission. See
Carol A. Laham, AO 2010-09, 2010 WL 3184267 (Fed. Election Comm’n July 22,
2010).
83. Diane Freda, Anonymous Donations Can Remain Secret Despite IRS
Requirement to Disclose, BLOOMBERG (July 26, 2012), http://go.bloomberg.com/
political-capital/2012-07-26/anonymous-donations-can-remain-secret-despite-irsrequirement-to-disclose/.
84. SpeechNow.org, 599 F.3d at 698.

MARTON_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

5/27/2013 7:22 PM

NEW YORK CITY CAMPAIGN FINANCE

689

institute new disclosure laws that would prevent money from being
anonymously funneled through nonprofits to political action
committees, the special interests that routinely contribute large
amounts to candidates can now contribute far larger sums to PACs.
For example, real estate developers currently are limited to $4,950 in
individual contributions to candidates and maximize their impacts by
having multiple partners or employees contribute at that level, or by
bundling legal contributions for a candidate. Now a developer could
just as easily take one million dollars to set up a PAC with similar
electoral and policy goals. Other interest groups, like unions, already
have sophisticated campaign infrastructures, and would have less to
benefit from SpeechNow.Org, though the decision certainly does not
hurt them. The impact of potential New York City “Super PACs” is
discussed at greater length in Part III.
C.

McComish v. Bennett and Trigger Funds

In the meantime, another set of campaign finance reform cases
weaved its way through the federal courts. The Arizona public
financing system, established by referendum following a series of
scandals in the late 1990s that engulfed numerous state legislators,
was challenged as an unconstitutional infringement of the First
Amendment.85 A similar “clean elections” system was challenged
concurrently in Connecticut.86 Like the New York City system,
Arizona encouraged voluntary participation into a system in which
candidates could receive public matching funds in return for a pledge
to limiting the amount they raised and spent. Non-participating
candidates were free to raise and spend as they wished, but if they
spent above the amount of public funding given to participating
candidates by the state, they “triggered” the state to award their
opponents a dollar for dollar match of any amount above that
threshold. In verbiage that would come back to haunt Arizona, this
provision was designed “to level the political playing field” between
well-financed candidates and their publicly financed opponents.87
This “trigger” provision became the subject of the legal challenge
against Arizona’s system. Candidates such as State Senator John

85. McComish v. Brewer, No. CV–08–1550–PHX–ROS, 2010 WL 2292213 (D.
Ariz. Jan. 20, 2010).
86. Green Party of Conn. v. Garfield, 616 F.3d 213, 241 (2d Cir. 2010) (affirming
District Court’s holding that the trigger funds unconstitutionally infringed on First
Amendment rights, citing Citizens United).
87. McComish v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2825–26 (2011).
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McComish claimed that the provision infringed on his right to free
speech because he was less inclined to spend money knowing that
doing so would automatically result in his opponent spending more
money to defeat him.88 Even more unfair, McComish claimed, was
that this law included any amount spent on his behalf, even by an
independent outside party, such that an uncoordinated advertising
campaign in his favor would trigger funds that his opponent could use
to defeat him.89 In the aftermath of Citizens United, it was clear that
this provision would be scrutinized.
The District Court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs,90 but the Ninth
Circuit reversed, holding that the trigger funds, rather than restricting
First Amendment speech, led to the infusion of more speech.91 The
court pointed to a “scattered” and “vague” factual record that
displayed only “a minimal burden on First Amendment rights” due to
candidate or donor concerns over trigger fund repercussions.92 The
case was argued before the Supreme Court in early 2011, with
Citizens United still fresh on the minds of a public that again
conferred more attention than usual to the campaign finance reform
decision. Only a few months earlier, at his State of the Union
address, President Barack Obama’s condemnation of Citizens United
had created a political firestorm.93
The Supreme Court once again decided by a 5-4 margin that the
campaign finance regulations before them did not survive First
Amendment scrutiny.94 The dissenters argued that Arizona was
merely injecting “more speech” into the political arena, but the
majority held that trigger funds improperly “leveled the playing field”
and disincentivized speech by requiring a candidate spending money
on his campaign to “help disseminate hostile views” by triggering
state funds to flow to his opponent.95 The Court’s ruling was not a
death-blow to public financing, but in finding trigger funds

88. See Brief for Petitioners at 30–31, McComish v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806
(2011) (Nos. 10-238, 10-239).
89. See id. at 32.
90. Brewer, 2010 WL 2292213.
91. McComish v. Bennett, 611 F.3d 510 (9th Cir. 2010).
92. Id. at 513, 517–18.
93. Steve Padilla, Obama’s State of the Union Address: Criticism of the Supreme
L.A.
TIMES
(Jan.
27,
2010),
Court
Campaign
Finance
Ruling,
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/washington/2010/01/obamas-state-of-the-unionaddress-criticism-of-the-supreme-court-campaign-finance-ruling.html.
94. McComish v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011).
95. Id. at 2821 n.8.
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unconstitutional and once again demonstrating a strong preference
for unfettered First Amendment campaign speech, the ruling wiped
out the “clean elections” laws operating to various degrees in nine
different states. This cast an even brighter spotlight on New York
City’s system.
Trigger funds were not a prominent feature of the New York City
system, but they did exist. Under the 2009 CFB guidelines,
participating candidates received public matching funds at a rate of
6:1.96 Those funds increased to a matching rate 8.57:1 when a
nonparticipating opponent spent three times over the voluntary
contribution limit.97 Thus one could argue that the New York City
system was penalizing certain levels of fundraising by rewarding
candidates with higher matching fund rates. The CFB distinguished
the Arizona law from New York City’s in a statement issued by CFB
Executive Director Amy Loprest immediately following the Supreme
Court’s decision.98 The statement laid out two main differences
between the Arizona and New York City laws. First, the Arizona law
provided grants from the state once a nonparticipating candidate
breached the trigger threshold, whereas in New York City candidates
received higher matching fund rates for money privately raised.99
Second, the Arizona provision was triggered by the amount spent by
non-participating candidates and independent groups spending on
their behalf, while the New York law did not consider independent
actors at all.100 The statement also pledged to study the matter
further.101
Loprest was not alone in defending the viability of the New York
City system in the wake of McComish. Fordham Law Professor
Zephyr Teachout expressed optimism that the decision did not, as
feared, “touch public financing generally, and did not touch

96. Morgan Pehme & Janos Marton, Pulling the Trigger: U.S. Supreme Court
Threatens Campaign Finance Reform in NYC, HUFFINGTON POST (June 24, 2011),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/morgan-pehme/pulling-the-trigger-ussu_b_883387.html.
97. Id.; see also The Bonus Situation-2009 Citywide Elections, N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN
FIN. BD., http://www.nyccfb.info/candidates/candidates/bonusSituation.aspx (last
visited Mar. 6, 2013). There was also an intermediary bonus if a non-participating
candidate breached the voluntary spending limit, but spent less than three times the
limit. Id.
98. Press Release, supra note 54.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
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automatic matching funds.”102 Teachout trumpeted the Fair Elections
Now Act, which would provide a federal matching fund system akin
to the New York City model.103 Loyola Law Professor Richard
Hasen, who also runs ElectionLawBlog.com, wrote after McComish
that the New York City system “works differently” than the struckdown Arizona system, and suggestively titled his article, “New York
City as a Model?”104
Even if the ruling left New York City as a possible national model,
it did not leave New York City’s trigger provision untouched. In
April 2012, approximately nine months after the McComish decision,
the CFB began drafting rules “drawn up to keep as much fairness in
the system as possible, while complying with the Supreme Court
decision.”105 According to New York Civic, a good government
group, the CFB had “recently scrubbed any mention of this
mechanism of leveling the playing field from their website and
literature.”106 Given the hostile reaction of certain Supreme Court
justices to “leveling the playing field,” in McComish, this was a
prudent decision. The new rules developed since McComish no
longer provide a higher matching fund rate contingent on opponent
spending, but participating candidates are permitted to exceed CFB
spending limits if their nonparticipating opponents do the same,
though only with privately-raised funds.107
D. Ognibene v. Parkes: “Pay to Play” on Trial
On the heels of Citizens United and McComish, supporters of
campaign finance reform had to be concerned when New York City
faced an inevitable legal challenge in Ognibene v. Parkes.108 The suit
was brought by James Bopp, the legendary architect of the movement

102. Zephyr Teachout, What the Court Did and Didn’t Do, N.Y. TIMES, June 27,
2011, http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/06/27/the-court-and-the-futureof-public-financing/matching-funds-what-the-court-didnt-touch.
103. Id.
104. Richard Hasen, New York City as a Model?, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/06/27/the-court-and-the-future-ofpublic-financing/new-york-city-as-a-model-for-campaign-finance-laws.
105. Chris Bragg, In Wake of Recent Supreme Court Ruling, NYC Campaign
Finance Board Nixes Key Provision, CITY & ST. (Apr. 13, 2012),
http://www.cityandstateny.com/wake-supreme-court-ruling-nyc-campaign-financeboard-nixes-key-provision/.
106. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
107. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 3-706(3) (2012).
108. 599 F. Supp. 2d 434 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
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to end campaign finance regulation, having brought dozens of
challenges to campaign finance regulations since the 1980s, including
McConnell v. Federal Election Commission and Citizens United.109
Bopp challenged a number of provisions of the New York City law,
including the new “pay to play” provision, which severely curtails
contribution limits for entities that do business with the City.110 The
named plaintiff, Thomas Ognibene, was a Queens politician who had
mounted a number of campaigns on Republican and Conservative
lines from the 1980s through 2008, including a primary challenge to
Mayor Bloomberg in 2005 that was snuffed out when the Bloomberg
campaign successfully challenged his signatures.111
Local Law 34, an amendment to the Campaign Finance Act that
the City Council passed easily in 2007,112 had limited the size of
contributions that people doing business with the City could
contribute to candidates, whether or not the candidates participated
in the voluntary matching fund system.113 This “pay to play”
provision severely curtailed contribution limits for individuals doing
business with the city and extended the ban against corporate
contributions to LLCs and partnerships.
The regulation was
expansive, covering persons who contracted with the City, sought
zoning approvals, or purchased real property from the City.114 Those
who did business with the City were limited to making $400
contributions for citywide races and $250 for council races, regardless
of whether the recipient was participating in the voluntary matching
fund program.115

109. David Kirkpatrick, A Quest to End Spending Rules for Campaigns, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 24, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/25/us/politics/25bopp.html.
110. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE §§ 3-702 to 3-703 (2012). Local Law 34 was later
amended by Local Law 67.
111. Robin Shulman, Ognibene Loses Bid for Line on Ballot Against Bloomberg,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/04/nyregion/metro
campaigns/04ognibene.html.
112. See Ognibene, 599 F. Supp. 2d 434.
113. 2007 N.Y.C. Local Law No. 34 § 2 (codified as amended at N.Y.C. ADMIN
CODE § 3-702 (2012)).
114. Id.
115. Id.; see also N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE §§ 3-702 to 3-703 (2012). The tendency of
the Campaign Finance Act and its amendments to apply restrictions equally to
participating and non-participating candidates led to at least one critic declaring the
entire Act constitutionally suspect. Daniel Katz wrote that in an effort “not to strip
the non-participating candidate distinction of all meaning,” the Campaign Finance
Act permitted nonparticipating candidates to self-fund beyond regular contribution
limits, concluding, “The result of this is that a non-participating candidate is bound
not to accept more than a participating candidate from any source other than the
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While the 2007 amendments broadly defined doing business with
the city, and enacted severe restrictions on contribution limits, given
the billions of dollars at stake whenever a city rezones an area for
redevelopment, the City’s policy rationale was evident.116 During the
2006 hearings on the then-proposed amendments, the CFB found that
twenty percent of contributions during the 2001 and 2005 elections
had come from individuals and entities doing business with the city,
and that those contributions were frequently large, and
disproportionately made to incumbents.117 Ognibene claimed that the
new laws violated the First Amendment, and led a class of plaintiffs
filing for an injunction against them in advance of the 2009 elections.
Judge Laura Taylor Swain of the Southern District of New York
soundly rejected Ognibene’s claims, finding all of the challenged CFB
provisions constitutional.
Judge Swain found that under the
framework set forth in Buckley v. Valeo, the government had
established a rational basis for the stricter contribution limits by
demonstrating the “substantial evidence of the existence of a public

candidate’s own funds.” Daniel Katz, New York City’s Campaign Finance Law Is
Unconstitutional, ALBANY GOV’T L. REV. ONLINE (Mar. 16, 2009),
http://aglr.wordpress.com/2009/03/16/new-york-citys-campaign-finance-law-isunconstitutional/. Katz points out that this is not much of a distinction, given that the
right to unlimited self-fundraising was firmly established in Buckley and did not
depend on the City carving out a statutory exception. See id. Katz’s conclusion, that
the system “functionally reduces non-participating candidates from any person who
does not wish to participate in the city campaign finance system, to only those people
who are using their own resources to finance a campaign,” id., is perhaps an
overstatement. In 2012, two first-time candidates for city council, Ken Biberaj and
Corey Johnson, raised the maximum funds permitted for participating candidates by
the July 2012 reporting date. Chen, supra note 8. This maximum threshold
(approximately $80,000–90,000) for city council candidates is not a particularly
arduous sum to raise by political fundraising standards, as evidenced by these novice
candidates reaching it fifteen months before their respective primaries. While
Biberaj and Johnson have not indicated that they will abandon the matching fund
program, it stands to reason that future candidates with the ability to raise several
hundred thousand dollars for their city council races will bypass the matching fund
system, just as presidential candidates have abandoned the presidential public
financing program in recent election cycles. Challenges in the Presidential Public
Financing System, PUB. CITIZEN (July 19, 2012), http://www.citizen.org/documents/
presidential-election-public-financing-challenges.pdf.
116. Major re-zoning developments that have recently sought approval, been
approved or currently seek approval as this Article goes to print include Atlantic
Yards (Brooklyn), the NYU expansion (Manhattan), Hudson Yards (Manhattan),
East Midtown (Manhattan), Manhattanville (Manhattan), Kingsbridge Armory
(Bronx), and Willets Points (Queens). Collectively, and in many cases, individually,
these development projects are worth billions of dollars.
117. Ognibene, 599 F. Supp. 2d at 449.
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perception of corruption or the potential for corruption by those
doing business with the City.”118
Ognibene appealed the case to the Second Circuit. While the case
was on appeal, the Supreme Court issued its Citizens United decision,
and the plaintiffs asked the Second Circuit to re-brief the matter.119
The Second Circuit asked the parties to submit briefs on the
significance of Citizens United on the case before the court. While
the CFB’s position was clear from its earlier statement—that the
Supreme Court had clearly distinguished between contributions and
independent expenditures—James Bopp now focused on Justice
Kennedy’s argument that speakers could not be distinguished on the
basis of their identities, maintaining that New York City’s law
unconstitutionally discriminated against persons solely on the basis of
their financial dealings with the city.120
Even in the aftermath of Citizens United, the Second Circuit
rejected plaintiffs’ claims and upheld New York City’s campaign
finance laws, including the prohibition on corporate contributions,
disclosure requirements, and the “pay to play” provisions.121 As the
court pointed out, Citizens United had followed Buckley’s bifurcation
of contributions and independent expenditures, and applied its First
Amendment analysis to expenditures.122 The provisions at issue in
Ognibene v. Parkes all related to contributions, where the courts
could still give considerable deference to the government’s goal of
reducing corruption or the appearance of corruption.
In June, the plaintiffs filed a petition for certiorari to the U.S.
Supreme Court. On June 25, 2012, the Supreme Court declined to
review the decision,123 which assured that key provisions of the New
York City law would remain in place for the 2013 elections.
Following the decision, New York City Law Department senior
counsel Jane Gordon channeled the Second Circuit when she stated,
“The City’s highly regarded Campaign Finance Law addresses a

118. Id. at 448.
119. Jisha Dymond, Ognibene v. Parkes: NYC Lobbyists’ Challenge Revived in
Wake of Citizens United, CORP. POL. ACTIVITY L. BLOG (Feb. 24, 2010),
http://www.corporatepoliticalactivitylaw.com/index.php/2010/02/ognibene-v-parkesnyc-lobbyists-challenge-revived-in-the-wake-of-citizens-united/.
120. Reply Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 19, Ognibene v. Parkes, 671 F.3d 174
(2d Cir. 2011) (Nos. 09-0994-cv(L), 09-1432-cv(CON)), 2010 WL 6710720.
121. Ognibene v. Parkes, 671 F.3d 174, 178 (2d Cir. 2011).
122. Id. at 183–84.
123. Ognibene v. Parkes, 671 F.3d 174 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 28
(2012).
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significant governmental interest in reducing corruption and the
appearance of corruption.”124
Interestingly, the Supreme Court’s decision to decline review came
on the same day that it reversed a Montana Supreme Court decision
limiting corporate spending on state elections.125 The Montana ruling
had seemed to be at odds with Citizens United, but the Montana
Supreme Court had held that Citizens United did not apply to state
campaign finance laws, particularly laws predicated on very real
issues of corruption, which had precipitated the passage of Montana’s
campaign finance laws more than a century earlier.126 Montana’s
documented rationale for legislating against the corrupting influence
of corporations challenged Justice Kennedy’s assertion that
independent spending by definition could not be corrupting. The
Supreme Court did not buy the argument, however, issuing another 54 defeat to campaign finance reform.
Thus, even though New York City’s system survived this round of
litigation, the Supreme Court’s message to Montana made it clear
that the campaign finance jurisprudence governing Citizens United
would apply to New York City, should New York City attempt to
defy Citizens United by regulating independent expenditures in any
meaningful way. While the four dissenting Justices in Citizens United
and McComish may well be open to revisiting those decisions, the
Court’s current jurisprudential trajectory clearly favors First
Amendment campaign speech over government regulation.127
E.

McDonald Challenges New York City Contribution Limits

With the 2013 Republican field for mayor still up in the air during
summer 2012, George McDonald, the founder of the non-profit Doe
124. Joseph Ax, Supreme Court Declines to Hear NY Campaign Finance Case,
REUTERS
(June
25,
2012),
http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com/
New_York/News/2012/06_-_June/Supreme_Court_declines_to_hear_NY_campaign_
finance_case/.
125. Am. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490, 2491 (2012).
126. W. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Att’y Gen., 271 P.3d 1, 5–6 (Mont. 2011).
127. In a recent matter, the three Republican members of the F.E.C. held that
under Citizens United, an employer was permitted to coerce its employees into
participating in campaign activity, provided the activity was independent from the
campaign. United Public Workers, MUR 6344 (Fed. Election Comm’n Aug. 21,
2012),
available
at
http://eqs.nictusa.com/eqsdocsMUR/12044320562.pdf.
Additionally, the Fourth Circuit recently had to reverse a District Court decision
lifting the ban on corporate contributions to campaigns that had relied on Citizens
United. The case may be appealed to the Supreme Court. United States v.
Danielczyk, 683 F.3d 611 (4th Cir. 2012).
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Fund, declared himself as a possible candidate.128 As neither a
lifelong politician nor a candidate who could self-fund an entire
campaign, McDonald would have difficulty raising sufficient funds
under New York City’s contribution limits. On January 7, 2013,
McDonald brought suit challenging New York City’s contribution
limits on the grounds that state law preempts them, which allows for
significantly higher contribution limits (individuals may contribute
$19,700 from primary elections, and $41,000 for general elections, and
corporations are permitted to donate directly to campaigns).129
McDonald’s complaint claimed that the City Council had no
authority to legislate contribution limits in contravention of state law,
and that state election law occupied the field.130 In an accompanying
press release, McDonald added that the current system was “rigged”
against “everyday New Yorkers,” and “[w]ithout a personal fortune
or preexisting base of donor support, it’s impossible to raise the funds
necessary to compete for the Mayor’s office in New York.”131
Election lawyer Jerry Goldfeder previously has written, “State law
appears to preempt localities from enacting contribution or
expenditure limits.”132 Fellow election lawyer and former state
senator Marty Connor somewhat concurred: “I wouldn’t say
[McDonald’s lawsuit is] a frivolous case,” though he noted, “the
courts seemed to give leeway in past years to the city doing its own
thing.”133 Should McDonald succeed in his suit, candidates during the
next election cycle would be more than tempted to leave a voluntary
public matching fund system that caps spending at such a low figure in
comparison to the enormous individual contributions allowed by state
campaign finance laws. On the other hand, if Governor Cuomo

128. Celeste Katz, Doe Fund Founder George McDonald Mulling 2013 Mayoral
on Republican Line, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 11, 2012),
http://www.nydailynews.com/blogs/dailypolitics/2012/08/doe-fund-founder-georgemcdonald-mulling-2013-mayoral-bid-on-republican-line.
129. Complaint, McDonald v. N.Y.C. Campaign Fin. Bd., No. 100038-2013 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Jan. 8, 2013), available at http://iapps.courts.state.ny.us/iscroll/
SQLData.jsp?IndexNo=100038-2013 (follow “Summons and Complaint” hyperlink).
130. Id.
131. Celeste Katz, Document Drop: George McDonald vs. the CFB, N.Y. DAILY
NEWS, Jan. 8, 2013, http://www.nydailynews.com/blogs/dailypolitics/2013/01/
document-drop-george-mcdonald-vs-the-cfb.
132. Goldfeder, supra note 12, at 13 n.2.
133. Andrew Hawkins & Shane Kavanaugh, McDonald to Challenge Campaign
Finance Limits, CRAIN’S N.Y. BUS., Oct. 2, 2012, http://www.crainsnewyork.com/
article/20121002/INS/121009989.
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continues his pursuit of campaign finance reform at the state level,134
McDonald’s suit could be rendered moot, as the City and State
election laws become mirrors of each other.
On May 1, 2013, Justice Kathryn Freed issued an exhaustive
decision rejecting McDonald’s petition.135 The decision reviewed the
legislative history behind New York City’s campaign finance laws and
concluded that New York City’s public financing system was “merely
another approach to electing public officers,” and thus permitted
under Municipal Home Rule.136 On May 17, 2013, McDonald
announced that he would appeal Justice Freed’s decision, highlighting
the “deviant” behavior of potential matching fund recipients Anthony
Weiner and Vito Lopez as examples of the system’s failure.137
III. THE SPENDERS: N EWCOMERS AND REPEAT PLAYERS IN NEW
YORK CITY ELECTIONS
New York City’s political commitment to vigorously regulating
money in politics is remarkable given the City’s preponderance of
wealthy individuals, corporations, and savvy political operators. Even
in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, New York City remains
flush with campaign donors who are contributing more to campaigns
than ever. Through the first five disclosure periods of the 2009
election (through July 2008), 34,494 contributors had donated $14.1
million, with more than half of the contributions coming from
Manhattan.138 By the end of the 2009 election, the twelve citywide

134. Katrina Vanden Heuvel, Cuomo’s Clean Elections Choice, NATION (Jan. 22,
2013), http://www.thenation.com/blog/172346/cuomos-moment-truth-clean-electionschoice#. State legislative proposals include pubic financing and strict contribution
limits.
135. McDonald v. N.Y.C. Campaign Fin. Bd., No. 100038/2013 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May
1, 2013).
136. Id.
137. Celeste Katz, GOP’s George McDonald Dings “Deviants” Anthony Weiner,
Vito Lopez in CFB Fight, N.Y. DAILY NEWS DAILY POL. (May 17, 2013, 5:12 PM),
http://www.nydailynews.com/blogs/dailypolitics/2013/05/gops-george-mcdonalddings-deviants-anthony-weiner-vito-lopez-in-cfb-fight. Anthony Weiner, a mayoral
candidate, was the subject of a controversy relating to lewd photos he sent over
Twitter, and potential City Council candidate Vito Lopez recently resigned his State
Assembly seat over sexual harassment charges. Raymond Hernandez, Weiner
Resigns in Chaotic Final Scene, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/17/nyregion/anthony-d-weiner-tells-friends-he-willresign.html.
138. Contributions to New York City Candidates, N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FIN. BD.,
http://www.nyccfb.info/maps/maps.htm?sm=press_maps (last visited Mar. 6, 2013).
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candidates raised over $34 million.139 Five disclosure periods into the
2013 election, 48,713 contributors had donated $20.4 million, with
Manhattan accounting for 58.5% of the contributions. The uptick in
contributions from 2009 may simply be a result of the more crowded
field for mayor and higher number of open City Council seats.
Considering the vast sums being spent on the 2012 presidential
elections by candidates and outside parties, $20.4 million is not an
enormous figure. According to the Center for Responsive Politics,
the New York metro area had contributed $143.5 million to the 2012
presidential election as of September 1, 2012,140 and New York
Senator Kirsten Gillibrand had raised over $14 million for her reelection campaign.141 With the 2013 election approaching, several
interest groups are expected to reprise their perennial involvement in
campaign spending, while other organizations are muscling up for the
first time.
A. Self-Funding
If there was ever a reason to doubt the efficacy of New York City’s
campaign finance reform laws, it was the political ascent of Michael
Bloomberg. During Bloomberg’s three campaigns for mayor in 2001,
2005, and 2009, he self-funded to the tune of $74 million, $85 million,
and $102 million, respectively.142 Had Bloomberg participated in the
matching fund system, he would have been capped at $6 million for
the general election, which is how he outspent his participating
opponent, Bill Thompson, by a margin of fourteen to one.143
Reflecting on those campaigns, New York Public Interest Research

139. Azi Paybarah, Stringer and Quinn Set the Standard on Bundlers, While de
CAPITAL
N.Y.
(Nov.
30,
and
Thompson
are
Liu-Like,
2011),http://www.capitalnewyork.com/article/politics/2011/11/4364815/stringer-andquinn-set-standard-bundlers-while-de-blasio-and-thomps.
This figure does not
include the $102 million of Michael Bloomberg’s own money that he spent on behalf
of his re-election efforts.
140. Top Metro Areas, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POL., http://www.opensecrets.org/
overview/topmetro.php (last visited Mar. 6, 2013).
141. Kristen Gillibrand Campaign Finance Summary, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POL.,
http://www.opensecrets.org/politicians/summary.php?cid=n00027658 (last visited
Mar. 6, 2013).
142. Michael Barbaro, Michael Bloomberg Spent $102 Million to Win 3rd Term,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/27/nyregion/
28spending.html.
143. See id.
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Group staff attorney Gene Russianoff felt that Bloomberg had “done
long-term damage to the system.”144
Even before Bloomberg’s mayoral runs and Citizens United, the
Supreme Court had spoken clearly on the unconstitutionality of
regulating self-financing.145
The self-financing option remains
available for wealthy individuals, of which New York has no shortage.
John Catsimatidis, owner of the Gristedes supermarket chain, had
floated his name as a potential self-funded candidate in 2009, prior to
term limits being overturned, and may well run in 2013.146
Catsimatidis has said that if he does not run, he might consider
putting money into a Super PAC if he feels strongly about a
particular candidate.147 “It’s got to be a level playing field with the
unions, and I’m sure they’ll be matched dollar for dollar,” he said,
“So yes, I think it could be very important next year.”148 In a head-tohead mayoral campaign Catsimatidis’s opponents would not even
have the benefit of the trigger funds utilized by Mark Green,
Fernando Ferrer, and Bill Thompson in their general election
campaigns against Bloomberg’s limitless checkbook. As of January
2013, Catsimatidis has deposited one million dollars into his own
account,149 and told Joe Lhota, a potential rival for the Republican
nomination, that he was willing to spend ten or twenty million dollars
of his own money, and “that’s your challenge, and you have to decide
what you want to do.”150

144. Id.
145. See generally Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724 (2008). In a 5-4
decision authored by Justice Alito, the Court held that penalties assessed against
candidates who self-funded beyond a certain amount did not serve any government
interest, because Buckley v. Valeo had held that self-funding reduced, rather than
increased, corruption. Id. at 726.
146. Interview by Sam Roberts with John Catsimatidis (NY1 television broadcast
June 2, 2012), available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jRE58BujDWM.
147. Daniel Massey, Super PACs Eyed for Mayoral Election, CRAIN’S N.Y. BUS.
(May
13,
2012),
http://www.crainsnewyork.com/article/20120513/POLITICS/
305139969. Catsimatidis has intonated that someone he feels “strongly” about
supporting is New York Police Department Commissioner Ray Kelly.
148. David Chen, In 2013 Races, New York Prepares for ‘Super PAC’ Effect, N.Y.
TIMES, July 31, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/01/nyregion/new-york-cityregulators-prepare-for-super-pacs-effect-on-local-elections.html.
149. Beth Morrissey, The Mayoral Money Game, N.Y. WORLD (Jan. 24, 2013),
http://www.thenewyorkworld.com/2013/01/24/mayoral-money-game/.
150. Grace Rauh, Lhota Lays Groundwork for Possible Mayoral Campaign, NY1
(Jan. 3, 2013), http://www.ny1.com/content/top_stories/174932/lhota-lays-groundwork
-for-possible-mayoral-campaign.
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For his part, Bloomberg will not be spending freely for a fourth
straight election. Bloomberg acknowledged that spending liberally
on behalf of his preferred candidate “wouldn’t work,” and would
likely backfire. His preferred candidate is currently Quinn, though
the field remains in flux.151
B.

A New York City Super PAC

On the first day of 2008, a law took effect that banned candidates
from accepting money from LLC’s and partnerships.152 While LLCs
and partnerships had already donated 3.2% of all contributions in the
2009 elections, that category of donation will be gone entirely by New
York City’s 2013 elections.153 However, corporate money will happily
find a home in PACs, and perhaps even Super PACs, in New York
City elections.
The 2012 federal election cycle demonstrated the impact of Super
PACs, with large amounts of money funded by a small number of
individuals.154 Super PACs raised more than $300 million for that
election cycle, 68% of which came from mega-donors contributing
$500,000 or more.155 Crain’s New York wrote that the emergence of
Super PACs in New York City was “inevitable,” and noted that they
increased the viability of a late-entry candidate like New York Police
Commissioner Ray Kelly.156 “There will be super PACs,” said New
York Republican State Committee Chairman Ed Cox.
“It’s
impossible not to have them. They’re a part of the process now.”157
Cox added, “You’ll find there will be a lot of people in this city, which
is a wealthy city, who will want to support the candidate, and the
mechanism to do that will be a super PAC.”158
151. Sally Goldenberg, Mike ‘Cashing Out’ of Next Mayor Race, N.Y. POST, Dec.
27, 2012, http://www.nypost.com/p/news/local/mike_cashing_out_of_next_mayor_race
_8yja6L8NqPhSiOK-kCkgq.
152. 2007 N.Y.C. Local Law No. 34 § 18.1 (codified as amended at N.Y.C. ADMIN.
CODE § 3-702 (2012)); see N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 3-703(1)(l). The law survived a
constitutional challenge in Ognibene v. Parkes. See supra Part II.D.
153. Hamilton, supra note 2.
154. Josh Israel, Two-Year Anniversary of SpeechNow v. FEC Ruling, THINK
PROGRESS (Mar. 26, 2012), http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2012/03/26/451808/twoyear-anniversary-of-speechnoworg-v-fec-ruling/?mobile=nc.
155. Paul Blumenthal, Super PAC Contributions Top $300 Million, Most Goes To
GOP Groups, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 22, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2012/08/22/super-pac-contributions_n_1822290.html.
156. Massey, supra note 144.
157. See id.
158. Id.
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Crain’s listed Ray Kelly (who has the support of Catsimatidis and
former chairman of the New York Stock Exchange, Richard Grasso,
as potential super PAC donors), New York State Board of Regents
Chancellor Merryl Tisch, and charter schools executive Eva
Moskowitz as potential beneficiaries of Super PAC funding.159
Crain’s is a business trade publication, so it is not a coincidence that it
highlighted individuals perceived to be more “business-friendly” and
in line with Mayor Bloomberg’s economic policies than the
Democratic candidates, though the paper did not rule out business
Super PAC support for a moderate Democrat, City Council Speaker
Christine Quinn.160
C.

The Education Wars

The proliferation of charter schools has been perhaps the most
controversial educational issue during Mayor Bloomberg’s tenure.
Mayor Bloomberg has championed the expansion of charter schools,
co-locating them in many existing public school buildings.161 Because
the state legislature and the next mayor will have the ability to undo
much of Mayor Bloomberg’s work on this issue, charter school
supporters have formed a PAC, StudentsFirstNY, which will be led
by top Bloomberg aide, Micah Lashner, and which counts
Bloomberg’s former Board of Education Chancellor, Joel Klein, as
one of its board members.162 StudentsFirstNY states its mission rather
innocuously: “StudentsFirstNY is New York’s leading voice for
students who depend on public education for the skills they need to
succeed, but who are too often failed by a system that puts special
interests, rather than the interests of children, first.”163
More substantively, the organization is expected to advance a
policy agenda of reforming public school teacher tenure and
proliferating the number of charter schools in New York City.
StudentsFirstNY has vowed to raise $50 million over the next five

159. Id.
160. See id.
161. See, e.g., Al Baker, Likely Mayoral Contenders Suggest Improving
Bloomberg’s Leadership of Schools, NY TIMES, Nov. 19, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/20/nyregion/nyc-mayoral-hopefuls-discussimproving-schools.html.
162. Anna Phillips, StudentsFirstNY Announces Itself, SCHOOLBOOK (Apr. 4,
2012), http://www.schoolbook.org/2012/04/04/studentsfirstny-announces-itself/.
163. Our Mission in New York, STUDENTSFIRSTNY, http://www.studentsfirst.org/
pages/our-mission-in-new-york (last visited Mar. 6, 2013).
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years to support Mayor Bloomberg’s education policy,164 an enormous
sum by New York City political standards. Bill de Blasio and John
Liu, 2013 mayoral contenders, have said that they will not accept
donations from the PAC, while Christine Quinn has said that she will
accept their donations, and presumably, would not complain about
their outside spending on her behalf.165
While StudentsFirstNY may be new to the political landscape, their
target and foe, the United Federation of Teachers (UFT), has long
been a heavy spender in New York elections.166 In the 2005
Manhattan Borough president race, for example, the UFT spent
aggressively against City Councilmember Eva Moskowitz, a wellknown charter school supporter.167 UFT President Michael Mulgrew
has vowed to push back against StudentsFirstNY spending by
devoting significant UFT resources to the 2013 elections, and even
raised the possibility of the UFT forming its own super PAC.168
But the UFT has concerns beyond StudentsFirstNY—it will likely
negotiate a new contract for 75,000 teachers with the next mayor.169
The UFT has given the maximum $4,950 to all four of the leading
Democratic mayoral candidates, Council Speaker Christine Quinn,
former Comptroller Bill Thompson, Public Advocate Bill de Blasio,

164. Sarah Butrymowicz, Ed in the Election: New York Group Tries to Tie
HECHINGERED
(Aug.
17,
2012),
to
Anti-Union
Group,
http://hechingered.org/content/ed-in-the-election-new-york-group-tries-to-tieromney-to-studentsfirst_5410/.
165. Azi Paybarah, With Eye Toward the UFT, de Blasio Rejects
StudentsFirstNY,
CAPITAL
N.Y.
(Aug.
22,
2012),
http://www.capitalnewyork.com/article/politics/2012/08/6481074/eye-toward-uft-deblasio-rejects-studentsfirstny; see also Celeste Katz, More NYC Pols Swear Off
Students First NY Campaign Help, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Aug. 21, 2012,
http://www.nydailynews.com/blogs/dailypolitics/2012/08/more-nyc-pols-swear-offstudents-first-ny-campaign-help.
166. See, e.g., Carl Campanile, UFT’s $6.3M Albany Tab, NY POST, Oct. 25, 2010,
http://www.nypost.com/p/news/local/uft_albany_tab_uD4z5ZGiZLNa1KBoUSCH6N
(discussing the UFT’s lobbying and campaign expenses in 2010).
167. See Michael Cooper, Scott Stringer Wins a Crowded Primary and a Likely
Election as Borough President, NY TIMES, Sept. 14, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/
2005/09/14/nyregion/metrocampaigns/14manhattan.html (discussing Scott Stringer’s
defeat of Eva Moskowitz in the democratic primary election for Manhattan borough
president and noting the UFT’s opposition to Moskowitz’s candidacy and support for
Stringer).
168. Chen, supra note 148.
169. Michael Howard Saul, Union Money Floods City’s 2013 Election, WALL ST. J.,
July
23,
2012,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444330904577
539593988630720.html.
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and Comptroller John Liu, though it has not endorsed a candidate.170
“We are going to be there financially,” Mr. Mulgrew said, “[a]nd,
then, we have to engage in our organizing, grass-roots work.”171
D. The Long Reach of Unions and the Working Families Party
While union membership has been in decline across the country for
decades, one wouldn’t know it from observing the role that unions
play in New York City politics. The UFT may be among the betterknown unions in the City, but it is only one of many involved in local
elections. Another education-based union, the Council of School
Supervisors and Administrators, has boosted its political spending
fifty-seven percent from this point in the 2009 election cycle.172 Their
spokesperson, Chiara Coletti, attributed the increase to involved
educators having been “under tremendous attack politically.”173 As of
late July 2012, the Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union
(RWDSU) had already contributed more than $31,000 to 2013
candidates, doubling its pace from 2009, and had persuaded the City
Council to pass living wage legislation in the process.174 Noting the
union’s increased activity, union president Stuart Appelbaum
explained, “We’re putting more focus on electing people who we
think can push a working person’s agenda forward.”175
Despite the overarching goal of increasing wages and benefits for
their respective members, unions have differing relationships with the
other titans of local campaign spending, the members of the real
estate industry. While construction unions often lobby alongside
developers with an eye towards construction jobs, unions like the
RWDSU go head to head with developers over wage issues. In 2009,
Related Companies attempted to develop the Kingsbridge Armory in
the Bronx by bringing a mall to the large, underdeveloped space.176
Advocates of “living wage” legislation, which would have required

170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. See Sam Dolnick, Panel Approves Conversion of Kingsbridge Armory into
NY
TIMES
CITY
ROOM
(Oct.
19,
2009,
3:32
PM),
Mall,
http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/10/19/panel-approves-conversion-ofkingsbridge-armory-into-mall/.
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developments that receive city subsidies to pay a living wage,177
pushed for all jobs at Kingsbridge to pay ten dollars per hour.178
Related Companies is no stranger to the political arena, having
donated large amounts to both Democrats and Republicans during
the 2012 election (its largest single donation was $100,000 to Restore
Our Future, a pro-Romney PAC), and it was ready to play hardball.179
Despite prolonged negotiations, Related Companies and unionbacked living wage advocates reached an impasse.180 Today there is a
new proposal to develop the space as an ice skating rink.181
Few entities have dominated the City political landscape in recent
years more than the Working Families Party (WFP). A progressive,
labor-backed third party that supports liberal Democrats as a fusion
ticket more often than it runs against Democrats, the WFP scored a
number of electoral successes in 2009, claiming credit for John Liu’s
Comptroller and Public Advocate Bill de Blasio’s victorious
campaigns.182 Its robust campaign infrastructure similarly has run
sophisticated mailing and canvassing operations to support
progressive, pro-union candidates throughout the city, including city
council races.183
The WFP’s get-out-the-vote operation has come under scrutiny,
however. The WFP’s campaign operation, Data and Field Services,
was accused of providing below-cost services to candidates supported
177. A narrower version of the “living wage” legislation was passed into law in
2012, overriding Mayor Bloomberg’s veto. Bloomberg sued to block the law in July
2012, and litigation is still pending. See Barbara Ross, Bloomberg Sues City Council
to Block ‘Living Wage’ Law, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, July 27, 2012,
http://articles.nydailynews.com/2012-07-27/news/32893800_1_minimum-wage-mayorbloomberg-city-subsidies.
178. Sam Dolnick, Voting 45-1, Council Rejects $310 Million Plan for Mall at
Bronx Armory, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/
12/15/nyregion/15armory.html.
179. See Related Companies, MONEY MONACLE, http://vote.sigfig.com/org/
Related%20Companies/- (last visited Mar. 6, 2013).
180. Dolnick, supra note 176.
181. Winnie Hu, Ice Center with 9 Rinks Is Proposed for Bronx Armory, NY
TIMES, Aug. 23, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/24/nyregion/ice-centerproposed-for-kingsbridge-armory.html.
182. De Blasio is the likeliest candidate to receive support from the Working
Families Party in his run for mayor. His haul from unions is already significant. See
generally Searchable Database: Bill de Blasio, 2013, N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FIN. BD.,
http://www.nyccfb.info/searchabledb/SimpleSearchResult.aspx?election_cycle=2013&
cand_id=326&cand_name=de+Blasio%2c+Bill (last visited Mar. 6, 2013).
183. See Courtney Gross, Proposal Could Shed Light on Who Helps Candidates,
GOTHAM GAZETTE (June 1, 2010), http://www.gothamgazette.com/index.php/
archives/532-proposal-could-shed-light-on-who-helps-candidates.
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by the WFP during the 2009 elections, precisely the type of illegal
coordination the CFB seeks to avoid.184 Shortly after the election, a
plaintiff’s firm led by former Giuliani deputy mayor Randy Mastro
filed a lawsuit claiming illegal campaign coordination.185 The WFP
initially settled, admitting no wrongdoing, and agreed to make Data
and Field Services a truly independent entity from the WFP.186 The
settlement was not fulfilled, however, and the WFP was found in
contempt.187 Today the WFP is also under investigation for illegal
campaign coordination by the Staten Island District Attorney’s
office.188 Despite these legal challenges, the WFP intends to maintain
its impressive canvassing operation in 2013 by having candidates pay
for those services directly.189
E.

The Real Estate Industry: Builders and Bundlers

The real estate industry makes no secret about its role in New
York politics. In 2009, the Real Estate Board of New York
(REBNY) poured more than $500,000 into a handful of city council
races—four Democratic primaries and one general election—in an
effort to support candidates whose policies were more favorable to
landlords than their WFP-supported opponents.190 REBNY used the
Independence Party as their vessel to send mailers and fund
canvassers.191 In addition to their outsider role in the 2009 city council
races, REBNY directly contributed more than $3.5 million to New
York State Senate races in 2010.192 A single real estate developer

184. Roy Edroso, Anti-WFP Suit Charges Debi Rose Didn’t Pay Enough for
Services (or at Least Not Fast Enough), VILLAGE VOICE BLOG (Oct. 27, 2009, 11:08
AM), http://blogs.villagevoice.com/runninscared/2009/10/anti-wfp_suit_c.php.
185. Id.
186. Azi Paybarah, Working Families Concedes and Downsizes Without
Admitting Wrongdoing or Defeat, CAPITAL N.Y. (Oct. 26, 2011 6:00 AM),
http://www.capitalnewyork.com/article/politics/2011/10/3897901/working-familiesparty-concedes-and-downsizes-without-admitting-wro.
187. Liz Benjamin, The Death of DFS, CAPITAL TONIGHT (Oct. 26, 2011),
http://capitaltonightny.ynn.com/2011/10/the-death-of-dfs/.
188. Shane Dixon Kavanaugh, New Investigation for Working Families Party,
CRAIN’S N.Y. BUS. (Apr. 26, 2012), http://www.crainsnewyork.com/article/
20120426/POLITICS/120429920.
189. Benjamin, supra note 187.
190. Eliot Brown, Landlords Have a Party, N.Y. OBSERVER, Dec. 9, 2009,
http://observer.com/2009/12/landlords-have-a-party/.
191. Id.
192. Eliot Brown, Real Estate Flexes Muscle, WALL ST. J., Oct. 11, 2010,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704127904575544323181587664.html.
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used campaign finance law loopholes to funnel more than $900,000
into 2012 State Senate races.193 During the 2013 election cycle the real
estate community may potentially flex its muscle even more than
usual through unchecked independent expenditures. Given its track
record and the stakes in this election cycle, it probably will.
The real estate industry thus far has coalesced around Democratic
frontrunner, Christine Quinn.194 Quinn has accepted maximum
contributions ($4,950) from dozens of individuals in the real estate
industry, including significant contributions from Related Companies,
Liberty Title, Cushman & Wakefield, Vornado Realty, CB Richard
Ellis, Rudin Management, Dermot Company, and Benjamin
Companies.195 Jay Kriegel from Related Companies, Mario Palumbo
from Millenium Partners, REBNY Chair Mary Ann Tighe, and
William Zeckendorf, the owner of Zeckdorf Realty, are among
Quinn’s top intermediaries, each raising at least $34,000 for her
campaign.196 One must note that the other candidates for mayor, Bill
de Blasio,197 John Liu,198 and Bill Thompson,199 have all received
considerable contributions from major developers.

193. Beth Morrissey, Real Estate Big Blankets State Senate Races with
Contributions, N.Y. WORLD (Sept. 12, 2012), http://www.thenewyorkworld.com/
2012/09/12/litwin-senate-spending/.
194. Quinn has also earned significant backing from the legal community. A
number of law firms have provided Quinn with at least $20,000, including Paul,
Weiss; Skadden Arps; Weil, Gotshal; Sullivan & Cromwell; Paul Hastings; and
notably, Gibbons, a mid-sized firm with offices in New York and New Jersey that has
contributed over $50,000 to her campaign. See generally Searchable Database:
Christine Quinn, 2013, N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FIN. BD., http://www.nyccfb.info/
searchabledb/SimpleSearchResult.aspx?cand_id=204&cand_name=Quinn,%20Christ
ine%20C&election_cycle=2013 (last visited Mar. 6, 2013). Law firms are well known
for their financial support of political candidates. In 2008, the legal industry
contributed $234 million to campaigns, overwhelmingly to Democratic candidates.
See Lawyers/Law Firms: Top Contributors 2011–12, OPENSECRETS.ORG,
http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/indus.php?ind=K01 (last visited Mar. 6, 2013).
The industry reprised its role in the 2010 federal elections. See Amanda Becker, Law
and Lobbying Firms Pump Millions of Dollars into Midterm Campaigns, WASH.
POST, Nov. 1, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2010/10/29/AR2010102905908.html.
195. See generally Searchable Database: Christine Quinn, 2013, supra note 194.
196. See id.
197. See generally Searchable Database: Bill De Blasio, 2013, supra note 182.
198. See generally Searchable Database: John C. Liu, 2013, N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FIN.
BD., http://www.nyccfb.info/searchabledb/SimpleSearchResult.aspx?election_cycle=
2013&cand_id=FI&cand_name=Liu%2c+John+C (last visited Mar. 6, 2013).
199. See generally Searchable Database: William C. Thompson Jr., 2013, N.Y.C.
CAMPAIGN FIN. BD., http://www.nyccfb.info/searchabledb/SimpleSearchResult.aspx?
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Sometimes unions and real estate developers share common goals.
Large development projects might pique the interest of both the real
estate development community and unions. For example, during the
fall of 2012 the planning process for the expansion of the Chelsea
Market was underway.200 Supporters included the REBNY, the
Building and Construction Trades Council of Greater New York, and
the SEIU Local 32BJ.201 The prospect of temporary construction
jobs, permanent office jobs, and lasting real estate revenues leads to
such politically powerful coalitions. The only organized opposition to
such projects comes in the form of neighborhood groups, which are
often powerless to stop such developments. All candidates running
for office need to be secure in their ability to fundraise and turn out
the vote to take the political risk of alienating the enormous spigots of
campaign cash and volunteers that the real estate lobby and union
tandems offer.
F.

Citizens United, Ray Kelly, and Joe Lhota

If there is any individual in New York City politics who can benefit
from a post-Citizens United landscape, it is Police Commissioner Ray
Kelly. The recipient of consistently strong approval ratings,202 despite
recent controversy over the NYPD’s “stop and frisk” procedures,203
Kelly’s candidacy has been floated for several years, generally by
Mayor Bloomberg supporters who do not see an obvious heir to
Bloomberg’s legacy. A poll taken last year showed Kelly with
significant support compared to the current candidates.204

election_cycle=2013&cand_id=260&cand_name=Thompson%2c+Jr.%2c+William+C
(last visited Mar. 6, 2013).
200. Shane Dixon Kavanaugh, Stringer Out on Limb Against Chelsea Market
Plan, CRAIN’S N.Y. BUS. (July 20, 2012, 12:42 PM), http://www.crainsnewyork.com/
article/20120719/REAL_ESTATE/120719859.
201. Id.
202. See, e.g., Poll Gives Ray Kelly Record Approval Rating, CBS N.Y. (Jan. 17,
2013, 11:18 AM), http://newyork.cbslocal.com/2013/01/17/poll-gives-ray-kelly-recordapproval-rating/.
203. See, e.g., NYPD Stop and Frisk: Ray Kelly Lashes Out at Critics in Daily
21,
2012,
11:14
AM),
News Editorial, HUFF POST N.Y. (May
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/05/21/nypd-stop-and-frisk-ray-kelly-dailynews_n_1532930.html (describing Ray Kelly’s response to criticism over the NYPD’s
stop and frisk practices).
204. See Bloomberg Losing Focus As Approval Sags, New Yorkers Tell
Quinnipiac University Poll; Kelly, Quinn Lead 2013 Mayoral Pack, QUINNIPIAC U.
(Oct. 19, 2011), http://www.quinnipiac.edu/institutes-centers/polling-institute/newyork-city/release-detail/?ReleaseID=1663.
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For his part, Kelly has never given an affirmative indication that he
is interested in running—in fact, he has insisted that he does not plan
to run.205 Given that he lacks the independent wealth of someone like
Bloomberg or Castimatidis, this hesitancy would ordinarily be fatal to
mounting a race for mayor of New York City; as of the time of this
publication, Kelly would have mere months to raise the millions of
dollars necessary to run a competitive race, introduce himself to
voters, and broadcast his positions on issues other than policing.
Citizens United and its progeny are what could still make Kelly’s
candidacy possible, however. A few wealthy backers could jumpstart
his campaign overnight and sustain his messaging, albeit in an
uncoordinated manner.
Kelly’s story raises an interesting perspective in the debate over
independent expenditures. If one puts aside the contentious debate
over his performance as police commissioner and assumes that he is
the ideal public servant, then the opportunities for outside parties to
do the heavy financial lifting for Kelly’s candidacy may be a boon to
democracy. Would voters prefer a sitting police commissioner to
fundraise extensively while on the job? If not, should members of a
mayor’s administration have to choose between performing their
duties and running for office, when legislators and other elected
officials clearly do not so limit themselves? And finally, does
spending large sums of money on behalf of an individual known, for
better or worse, by his record as police commissioner, carry the same
self-interested taint as spending on a candidate for his or her track
record on real estate deals or tax subsidies?206 If the success of the
small donor matching system is to make democracy more
participatory for voters and candidates without wealth, this not-sohypothetical example demonstrates the argument that John
McComish made, namely that loosened campaign finance laws can
sometimes make democracy more accessible, not less.
There are fewer hypotheticals when considering the candidacy of
Joe Lhota. Lhota served as Mayor Giuliani’s Deputy Mayor for
Operations, and later as Chairman of the Metropolitan Transit
205. Joe Coscarelli, Ray Kelly Adamant He’s Not Running for Mayor or Violating
Anyone’s Civil Liberties, DAILY INTELLIGENCER (Jan. 11, 2013, 9:34 AM),
http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2013/01/ray-kelly-adamant-hes-not-running-formayor.html.
206. The most obvious counterargument is that a candidate with unformed
positions on issues would be more beholden, not less, to the benefactors that
supported him, and benefactors with significant resources, as discussed throughout
Part III, usually have specific agendas.
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Authority (MTA).207 His performance in the aftermath of Hurricane
Sandy garnered a wave of positive press, and in January 2013 he
resigned his MTA position to declare his candidacy for mayor, doing
so at the annual meeting of the New York Building Congress.208
While his initial poll numbers are strong,209 and his wife has been
called a “fundraising powerhouse,”210 Lhota’s late entry into the race
and the disparity between Democratic and Republican party
registration in New York City suggest that his viability will depend in
part on whether an outside entity spends liberally on his behalf.
IV. REGULATIONS, PENALTIES, AND LOOPHOLES
Having established the origin of the New York City system in Part
I, the jurisprudential confines of election law in Part II, and the
players who can be expected to thrive under the new campaign
finance regime in Part III, we turn to a critically important question
for those looking to New York City as a model: Do regulators have
the teeth to make the system work? Any law is only as effective as
the threat of robust enforcement. In the zero-sum world of elections,
establishing effective deterrence is challenging because the benefit of
winning office almost always outweighs the cost of punitive measures
taken after illegal campaign activity.
A. The CFB Metes Out Meek Punishments
Without an effective mechanism for punishing non-compliance, the
Campaign Finance Act’s meticulously crafted provisions will do little
to deter illicit campaign activity. The CFB has not been shy about
handing out fines for campaign violations, and unlike its state
counterpart, which strikes little fear into the hearts of lax

207. Celeste Katz, As Joe Lhota Deliberates About a 2013 Mayoral Run, His Wife
His
Sounding
Board,
N.Y.
DAILY
NEWS,
Dec.
7,
2012,
http://www.nydailynews.com/blogs/dailypolitics/2012/12/as-joe-lhota-deliberatesabout-a-2013-mayoral-run-his-wife-is-his-sounding-boa.
208. David Seifman, Lhota: ‘I Would Not Have Left the MTA . . . If I Wasn’t
Going to Run for Mayor, N.Y. POST, Jan. 15, 2013, http://www.nypost.com/p/
news/local/would_mayor_have_left_the_mta_run_1cfcPs4M5O0eJjwZKq88MO.
209. Celeste Katz, Former MTA Chairman Joseph Lhota Leads Possible GOP
Mayoral Candidates but Would Get Crushed by Democrats: Poll, N.Y. DAILY NEWS,
Jan. 17, 2013, http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/dem-rivals-trounce-lhota-pollarticle-1.1241656.
210. Katz, supra note 207.

Is
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campaigns,211 its reports demonstrate an impressive attention to the
details of every campaign filing. The weakness in the CFB’s
regulation, however, is that the fines are simply insubstantial to
castigate improper behavior.
Consider the 2009 election cycle. Councilmember Mathieu Eugene
was found to have violated a number of campaign finance laws on ten
occasions, particularly the provision that campaign contributions must
be spent in furtherance of the campaign.212 Because the CFB found
that these ten violations represented $6,087.77 in undocumented
funds, Eugene was fined $608 ($4,666 for all of his violations).213 This
means that if Eugene or any other candidate sought to appropriate
campaign funds for personal use, which might be particularly
tempting in a non-competitive election cycle, the worst they can
expect from the CFB is a 10% “getting caught tax.” Despite these
troubles, Councilmember Eugene received $109,742 in public
matching funds.214
The last decade has also seen several instances of improper
coordination between candidates and outside groups. When SEIU
organizer Annabel Palma ran for City Council in 2003, the SEIU
spent heavily on the campaign.215 An investigation by the CFB found
that the SEIU had illegally collaborated with the candidate, to put it
mildly.216 The SEIU had essentially run Palma’s campaign out of their
offices, from printing literature to running its “get out the vote”
operation.217 As a result, the SEIU was assessed with three penalties
of $10,000 each.218 This figure hardly acts as a deterrent against one of
the most powerful unions in the country meddling in future races.
The $30,000 penalty sends a message to unions, corporations, and

211. Jon Campbell, $31 Million in New York Campaign Accounts Unreported,
Group Claims, EFFECTIVENY.ORG (Aug. 22, 2012), http://effectiveny.org/pressclip/news-coverage/small-donor-empowerment/democrat-and-chronicle-31-millionnew-york-campaign.
212. Mathieu
Eugene,
N.Y.C.
CAMPAIGN
FIN.
BD.
(2009),
http://www.nyccfb.info/PDF/PM/CY2012PM_Eugene_071212.pdf; see also Celeste
Katz, Campaign Finance Board Sets $17.5k in Fines, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, July 12, 2012,
http://www.nydailynews.com/blogs/dailypolitics/2012/07/campaign-finance-boardsets-175k-in-fines.
213. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
214. Id.
215. ANNABEL PALMA FINAL AUDIT, supra note 68, at 6.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
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other outside influence peddlers that the cost of electing a favorable
city councilmember is a modest cost of doing business.
Even worse, during Palma’s own legal investigation, the newly
elected councilmember used union funds to pay for her legal fees and
the penalties that the CFB assessed against her.219 Kevin Finnegan,
1199 SEIU’s political director, established a legal defense fund worth
at least $64,000, with $51,675 that the SEIU contributed and the rest
contributed from other unions and political sources.220 In her defense,
Palma claimed, “That fund was created separate and apart from my
knowledge. It’s an independent fund.”221 On a separate occasion,
Palma remarked, “I had no idea how I was going to pay this. The
CFB was calling me on a daily basis just like a creditor would. Was
the fund a blessing? I think so. If not, I would have been over
$100,000 in the hole to this day.”222 The CFB did not even make its
determination until 2007, by which point Palma had been reelected.223
She went on to win reelection to a final term in 2009.224
Palma is not the only recent candidate to use the independent
funds of potentially interested parties in paying off campaign finance
violations. Unions have also contributed to the legal defense funds of
Councilmembers Elizabeth Crowley and Jose Rivera.225 Rivera
needed to pay for his legal defense after the CFB fined him $56,245
for violations accrued during his 2003 campaign. The defense fund’s
address was identical to the address listed in Rivera’s City Council
campaign finance account.226 In response to the Gotham Gazette’s
reporting on this trend, Citizens Union executive director Dick
Dadey remarked, “I’m stunned that this practice is permissible. It
undercuts the integrity of the campaign finance penalty system for
gross violations and misuse of public funds.”227 The practice is legal,
219. Courtney Gross, Unions Pick Up Tab for Council Members’ Fines, Legal
Bills, GOTHAM GAZETTE (June 4, 2010), http://www.gothamgazette.com/index.php/
archives/535-unions-pick-up-tab-for-council-members-fines-legal-bills.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Michael Clancy, Campaign Finance Board Fines Barron, Palma, and Four
VILLAGE
VOICE
BLOG
(Oct.
11,
2007,
3:02
PM),
Others,
http://blogs.villagevoice.com/runninscared/2007/10/campaign_financ.php.
224. 2009 Election Results, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2009, http://elections.nytimes.com/
2009/results/city-council.html.
225. Gross, supra note 219. Rivera has been the city council majority leader since
2006.
226. Id.
227. Id.
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however, because contributions to legal defense funds do not
technically advocate for the victory or defeat of individual candidates.
This allows them to operate outside of the CFB’s regulated
contribution structure, and outside parties can even contribute
unlimited amounts to defense funds of candidates who participate in
the CFB’s public matching funds program.
Many of the other candidates discovered to have violated the
Campaign Finance Act were also incumbents, making their mistakes
less attributable to lack of familiarity with the rules. Councilmember
Vincent Ignizio was fined $1,802 for a variety of violations, including
going over the spending limit, even as he received $88,450 in public
funds. Councilmember Vincent Gentile was fined $26,882 for similar
offenses.228 Councilmember Ydanis Rodriguez was fined $4,750.229 In
defense of the candidates, some of the violations related to filing
omissions and did not imply foul play. The small fine amounts are of
little consequence to these officials, however, who, having won
reelection, are in a position to raise more funds from their donors.
Indeed, if a candidate competing in a close election had to choose
between risking a fine of several thousand dollars or risking his
career, the politically and fiscally prudent choice would be clear to
most candidates. The candidate simply needs to remember to pay the
fine before the next election cycle so that he is eligible for another
round of matching funds.230
These stories of elected officials flouting even basic campaign
regulations demonstrate how difficult it is to hold campaign finance
lawbreakers accountable. Even if these officials’ fines had been more
severe, their adept legal teams and well-funded supporters likely
could have mitigated them or paid them.231 The CFB is authorized,
under CFB Rule 2-02, to require a campaign to forfeit all public
matching funds if it has been found to improperly coordinate with an
228. N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FIN. BD., FINAL AUDITS: VINCENT GENTILE (2009),

available at http://www.nyccfb.info/PDF/PM/EC2009PM_Gentile_120811.pdf.
229. N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FIN. BD., FINAL AUDITS: YDANIS RODRIGUEZ (2009),

available at http://www.nyccfb.info/PDF/PM/EC2009PM_Rodriguez_120811.pdf.
230. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 3-703(1)(n) (2012).
231. One notable recent exception is former City Councilmember Kendall Stewart,
who was required to pay $200,000 in fines—all of the public funds he received and
more than $60,000 in penalties—for committing numerous infractions. This
staggering fine led election lawyer Jerry Goldfeder to remark, “The candidate had to
have really ran afoul of the campaign finance laws for such a Draconian penalty. It’s
very rare.” Nathaniel Herz, Ex-Councilmember Hit with $200k Bill from Campaign
Finance Board, N.Y. WORLD (Nov. 15, 2012), http://www.thenewyorkworld.com/
2012/11/15/ex-councilmember-hit-with-200k-bill-from-campaign-finance-board/.
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allegedly independent actor.232 This measure does not appear to have
been used very frequently. Likewise, the CFB may fine up to $10,000
per violation, and revoke all public funds for a “fundamental breach”
of CFB regulations, but the CFB does not hand down either of these
punishments often enough to create a realistic deterrence.233 Criminal
activity, of course, can be referred to law enforcement.234
Perhaps the law should be amended to make an entity convicted of
illegal coordination ineligible to participate in the following election
cycle. While such a law would certainly be challenged on First
Amendment grounds, restricting the speech of an entity convicted of
corruption would surely warrant consideration for the type of speech
that can be regulated to reduce the appearance of corruption. For
now, the CFB is obviously prohibited from declaring an election
winner invalid or meting out some other severe punishment, as an
arbiter of some other contest might upon finding conclusive evidence
that the winner cheated, and it must rely on the weak enforcement
stick of small fines. Smartly, however, the CFB knows that shaming
comes with its own deterrent effect. All of the examples provided
above were discussed in daily newspaper publications, bringing
disrepute to the elected official highlighted. The CFB makes access
to this information easy for the media, good government groups, and
political opponents by posting its determinations publicly as soon as it
makes them (which, unfortunately, may be quite some time after the
election), and emailing these determinations to anyone who signs up
for the CFB’s notifications.
B.

More Matching Fund Misuse

Critics have accused campaigns of using public matching funds to
boost campaign treasuries, even in the absence of competitive
reelection races.235 Because so many races for local office are noncompetitive, many candidates—usually incumbents—do not even use
the funds they are given for campaign purposes.236 Out of 140

232. See GOLDFEDER, supra note 12, at 22 n.72.
233. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 3-711(2)(b) (2012); N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FIN. BD. R. 2-02
(2010), available at http://www.nyccfb.info/act-program/rules/index.aspx#2_02.
234. See GOLDFEDER, supra note 12, at 43.
235. Ray Rivera, Russ Buettner & William Rashbaum, In Council Campaigns,
Relatives on the Payroll, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/
2008/04/25/nyregion/25council.html.
236. In theory, the CFB would not provide matching funds in noncompetitive
races, but candidates can submit a “Statement of Need” and can ask for funds using
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candidates accepting public funds during the 2009 election cycle, only
one refunded the balance of his matching funds in its entirety, and
only eleven refunded any money at all.237 The leftover money was
used to pay for victory parties, parking tickets, fines for poster
violations, and even fundraisers to raise more money eligible for
future matching funds.238 Even more scandalously, public matching
funds have been funneled to family members of candidates without
evidence that they worked on a campaign.239 Steering campaign funds
in such a manner is questionably legal even when private campaign
funds are involved, but even greater care should be taken when
taxpayer funds are concerned. Jurisdictions emulating New York
City’s model should consider the backlash against taxpayer money
inappropriately funding campaigns and plan spending guidelines
accordingly, especially for noncompetitive races.
C.

The Department of Sanitation and New York City
Campaigns

Interestingly, there is another entity that hits candidates hard both
through media shaming and the wallet.
The Department of
Sanitation has the unenviable task of removing the thousands of
illegal campaign posters hanging from property around the city the
morning after an election. The price of using city property for last
minute voter outreach is not cheap; the Department of Sanitation
fines candidates $75 for each violation.240 Nearly every mayor runs
afoul of this regulation to some degree; in 2009 Mayor Bloomberg
paid over $5,000 in fines for violations.241 But while Bloomberg is
seemingly always in position to cut such a check, other campaigns
often find their campaign coffers near empty at the very time they are
asked to pay these violations.

even the specter of an opponent as justification. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 3-705(7)
(2012).
237. Chris Glorioso, Candidates Who Take Public Funds Rarely Pay Back
Taxpayers, NBC N.Y. (Apr. 1, 2011), http://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/
Candidates-Who-Take-Public-Funds-Rarely-Pay-Taxpayers-Back-119099959.html.
238. Id.
239. Rivera et al., supra note 235.
240. See N.Y.C. DEP’T OF SANITATION, A SUMMARY OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
8 (2009), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/dsny/downloads/pdf/rules/digest/
DSNY_Rules_Reg.pdf.
241. Michael Howard Saul, Bloomberg, Liu Trade Barbs, WALL ST. J., Aug. 10,
2012,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390443404004577581683739863
926.html.

MARTON_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE)

716

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

5/27/2013 7:22 PM

[Vol. XL

The Department of Sanitation fined Bill Thompson $594,375 for
violations committed during his 2009 mayoral race,242 Bill de Blasio
more than $300,000 for his violations committed during his Public
Advocate race,243 and John Liu $527,400 for violations committed
during his Comptroller race.244 The New York Post suggested that it
was long overdue for de Blasio to pay the fine to remove it “as a
potential issue from his campaign,”245 a statement just as applicable to
de Blasio’s 2013 mayoral opponents, Liu and Thompson. Each of the
candidates could legally use their public matching funds to pay off the
fines, though that would be hundreds of thousands of dollars less that
they could spend on more pressing needs in their mayoral races.
D. The “Doing Business” Loophole
Part II of this Article analyzed the City’s “pay to play” provision
(also called the “doing business” provision), including the litigation
over its constitutionality in Ognibene v. Parkes. According to a
recent investigative report by the New York World, however, the
regulation may have a considerable loophole.246 When New York
World crosschecked the list of intermediaries registered with the CFB
against the New York City’s Doing Business database, it found
“[d]ozens of executives of companies that do business with city
government . . . raising nearly $1 million so far on behalf of
prospective 2013 candidates for mayor.”247 Serving as an intermediary
is not technically in violation of the provision limiting those doing
business with the city to $400 contributions.248 But allowing those
individuals to deliver enormous funds to campaigns certainly flouts

242. Editorial, Bill Thompson Must Stop Trying to Weasel Out of Paying Fines,
N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Apr. 12, 2012, http://articles.nydailynews.com/2012-0412/news/31326903_1_illegal-campaign-posters-public-campaign-financing-jerrygoldfeder.
243. David Seifman, Poster Boy de Blasio to Pay 300G, N.Y. POST, Sept. 29, 2011,
http://www.nypost.com/p/news/local/poster_boy_de_blasio_to_pay_qru5bAz9jn4MKz
GhDeXAyH.
244. Saul, supra note 241.
245. Seifman, supra note 243.
246. Beth Morrissey, The Campaign Finance Loophole Developers Love, N.Y.
WORLD
(Aug.
7,
2012)
[hereinafter
Morrissey,
Loophole],
http://www.thenewyorkworld.com/2012/08/07/the-campaign-finance-loopholedevelopers-love/; see also Beth Morrissey, Unpacking Campaign Bundlers, N.Y.
WORLD (Aug. 9, 2012), http://www.thenewyorkworld.com/2012/08/09/unpackingcampaign-bundlers/.
247. Morrissey, Loophole, supra note 246.
248. Intermediaries are governed under N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 3-702(12).
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the intention of the law. The New York World investigation noted
the particular prevalence of real estate developers among the
intermediaries, giving the example of Jay Kriegel, a lobbyist from
Related Companies who has bundled nearly $100,000 for Quinn, de
Blasio, and Thompson.249 New York World notes that Related
Companies recently won the right to build at Willets Point in Queens,
an area that may become a major commercial development zone.250
In 2009, Related Companies earned Council approval for Related’s
development of Hudson Yards, and, thanks to Quinn, were exempted
from the Council’s living wage bill for that project.251
The
intermediary who has bundled the most money so far for an
individual 2013 candidate is Charles Dorego, a senior vice president
at the real estate company Glenwood Management, who channeled
almost $150,000 to Manhattan Borough President Scott Stringer, who
ran for mayor throughout 2012 before switching to the comptroller
race.252
This loophole is not the only problem with the “pay to play”
provisions. Some have criticized them for not extending to municipal
unions, despite their obvious history of political spending and the risk
of corruption between the unions seeking new contracts and elected
officials determining them. Under the provision, “A union that
negotiates a collective bargaining agreement with the [C]ity on behalf
of its members” is not considered to be “doing business” with the
City, unless the union is a registered lobbyist or involved in a real
property transaction with the City.253 Additionally, under the “doing
business” law, corporations, partnerships and LLCs can donate to
PACs, but PACs “cannot make contributions with money received
from prohibited sources.”254 One wonders how effectively the CFB
can track a PAC’s movement of such highly fungible campaign funds.
249. Morrissey, Loophole, supra note 246.
250. Id.
251. Dana Rubinstein, The Hudson Yards Exception and Christine Quinn’s
Business-Safe Liberalism, CAPITAL N.Y. (Mar. 30, 2012, 2:20 PM),
http://www.capitalnewyork.com/article/politics/2012/03/5588041/hudson-yardsexception-and-christine-quinns-business-safe-liberalis.
252. Shane Dixon Kavanaugh, Mayoral Backers Raising Bundles, CRAIN’S N.Y.
BUS.
(Jan.
22,
2012),
http://www.crainsnewyork.com/article/20120122/
POLITICS/301229972.
253. Frequently
Asked
Questions,
N.Y.C.
CAMPAIGN
FIN.
BD.,
http://www.nyccfb.info/candidates/candidates/doing_biz_faq.aspx (last visited Mar. 6,
2013) (follow “Are unions included in the DBDB?” hyperlink).
254. Id. (follow “If a business is in the DBDB, can the business form a political
action committee that can make contributions to city candidates?” hyperlink).
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Regulating Political “Charities”

As discussed in Part I, New York City began requiring independent
organizations to disclose their campaign expenditures in late 2012. At
the federal level, political outfits masquerading as 501(c)(4) nonprofits, such as Americans for Prosperity (backed by the billionaire
brothers Charles and David Koch) and the Karl Rove-led Crossroads
GPS have been held to no such disclosure obligations,255 allowing
wealthy donors and corporate interests to donate funds without the
scrutiny that disclosure brings. Under the law, 501(c)(4)s are
required to serve a predominantly charitable, educational, or
recreational purpose in order to reap the benefits of being a taxexempt social welfare group.256 In 2012, the IRS sent detailed
inquiries to investigate whether such organizations were flouting the
law by raising and spending funds exclusively for political purposes,
which would carry significant fines for the organizations;
unfortunately, no such investigations were concluded by the end of
the 2012 general elections.257 Likewise, an attempted lawsuit to have
the names of certain non-profit donors released was recently turned
back by the D.C. Circuit.258 These efforts to put such nonprofit
organizations under greater scrutiny, however, may impact their
political aggressiveness in New York City’s upcoming elections.
Meanwhile, New York State Attorney General Eric Schneiderman
has launched an investigation into New York-based nonprofits across
the political spectrum seeking the same information.259 The Attorney
General’s office has jurisdiction over 501(c)(4)s that raise $25,000 or
more from New Yorkers,260 and given the prevalence of New York
City fundraising for both Democratic and Republican-affiliated
groups, that included most of the prominent 501(c)(4)s that were

255. See Peter Overby, As Election Nears, Keeping Donors a Secret Is Trickier,
NPR (Sept. 8, 2012, 5:59 AM), http://www.npr.org/2012/09/08/160788546/as-electionnears-keeping-donors-a-secret-is-trickier.
256. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(4)(A) (2006).
257. Brody Mullins & Jacob Gershman, IRS Probes Non-Profit Political Groups,
WALL. ST. J., June 27, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702
304830704577493054251481454.html.
258. Ctr. for Individual Freedom v. Christopher Van Hollen, 694 F.3d 108 (D.C.
Cir. 2012). The court held that the F.E.C. should clarify these rules, though paralysis
at the regulatory body suggests that an immediate clarification is unlikely.
259. Nicholas Confessore, Groups’ Campaign Spending Scrutinized in New York,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/09/us/politics/ericschneiderman-investigating-groups-campaign-spending.html.
260. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 172-a (McKinney 2002).
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involved in the 2012 election. Thus far there is no New York City
equivalent of Americans for Prosperity, but if one were to emerge, it
is reasonable to assume that Attorney General Schneiderman would
join the CFB in monitoring it closely. Daniel Kurtz, former head of
the Attorney General’s Charities Bureau, commented, “If he can
make an example of somebody, I think that can really have some
consequences.”261 In January 2013, Schneiderman began hearings on
a requirement that all non-profits that spend over $100,000 on city
and state elections, including 501(c)(4)s, register with the state to
disclose contributions of over $100.262 The far-reaching proposal
earned the praise of Democratic mayoral candidates Quinn, de
Blasio, and Thompson, but Schneiderman acknowledged that the
plan had opponents, and “he expected to defend these changes in
court.”263
F.

The “Member-to-Member” Exception

Early in 2013, the City Council approved Intro 978, legislation that
exempts organizations, corporations, and unions from disclosing
communications related to candidates in an election year.264 The bill
originated out of concern that the CFB’s 2010 regulations concerning
coordination between candidates and outside groups had become so
onerous that organizations could not even request biographical
information from candidates, or even schedule with them.265 In
response, the CFB had issued an advisory opinion clarifying that such
“logistical” activities were permitted.266 Nevertheless, the legislation
moved forward and passed overwhelmingly. Mayor Bloomberg
criticized the legislation as a “terrible idea” that would allow

261. Reid Pillifant, Eric Schneiderman’s Mission to Expose America’s Most
Influential Donors, CAPITAL N.Y. (Aug. 3, 2012), http://www.capitalnewyork.com/
article/politics/2012/08/6321774/eric-schneidermans-mission-expose-americas-mostinfluential-donors.
262. Curtis Skinner, Bold Campaign Spending Rules in the Spotlight, N.Y. WORLD
(Jan. 15, 2013), http://www.thenewyorkworld.com/2013/01/15/campaign-rules/.
263. Id.
264. Nick Powell, NYC Council Amends Campaign Finance Disclosure Rules,
CITY & STATE (Jan. 24, 2013), http://www.cityandstateny.com/city-council-passes-billamending-campaign-finance-disclosure-rules/.
265. Beth Morrissey, Campaign Finance Board Fires Back at City Council, N.Y.
WORLD (Jan. 11, 2013), http://www.thenewyorkworld.com/2013/01/11campaignfinance-fires-back/.
266. Id.
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corporations and unions to “get around [campaign finance limits].”267
The CFB also strongly opposed the legislation, with Executive
Director Amy Loprest stating in testimony before the City Council
that “[d]isclosure of money in politics is fundamental to the
democratic process,” and “a campaign message is a campaign
message, no matter where or to which audience it is aimed.”268 For
unions with large memberships, this legislation will act as an end run
around campaign finance laws, though the City Council vote suggests
a widespread political consensus that member-to-member
communications should be treated differently than external advocacy.
Meanwhile, it remains to be seen whether corporations will exercise
the right to communicate with their shareholders, and which other
membership organizations will take advantage of the legislation.
CONCLUSION
Public support for limiting the influence of money in elections is
overwhelming.269 Given the enormous challenge of preventing special
interest money from flowing where it seeks to go, the CFB should be
commended for its relentless and meticulous enforcement of the law.
Many of its shortcomings are statutory, jurisprudential or resourcerelated, but its savvy use of the charter amendment process,
presentation of data, and media accessibility make it a potent,
nonpartisan force for reform. No large jurisdiction adopting New
York City’s campaign finance model would be able to effectively
implement it without an organization approaching the CFB’s caliber.
Yet for all of the CFB’s successes in reducing the flow of special
interest money, problems endemic to a private contribution-driven
finance system remain.
Special interest groups with specific
legislative and contracting goals, like real estate groups, unions, law
firms, teachers, and charter school proponents, may not be permitted
to make contributions of greater than $4,950 per person, but they still
vastly outspend the average citizen.
Such groups had a
267. Erin Durkin, Mayor Bloomberg: Christine Quinn’s Bill to Allow Corporations
Pour Money at Mayoral Campaigns ‘Terrible Idea,’ N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Dec. 11, 2012,
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/bloomberg-quinn-mayoral-money-billterrible-idea-article-1.1218062.
268. Amy Loprest, Exec. Dir., N.Y.C. Campaign Fin. Bd., Testimony to City
Council Comm. on Governmental Operations (Jan. 16, 2013), available at
http://www.nyccfb.info/press/news/testimony/pdf/cfb/2013-01-16-AL-Testimony.pdf.
269. Mark Sherman, Poll: Strong Support for Campaign Spending Limits, YAHOO!
NEWS (Sept. 15, 2012), http://news.yahoo.com/poll-strong-support-campaignspending-limits-120557612--election.html.
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disproportionate influence on local elections before Citizens United
and other decisions gave them carte blanche to throw their weight
around as independent entities.
Even a system that publicly matches funds may not generate a
nexus between certain pressing local issues and the donors who fund
campaigns. Consider what will likely be one of the main policy issues
being discussed during the lead-up to the 2013 mayoral campaign, the
New York Police Department’s use of “stop and frisk” as a streetpolicing strategy. The strategy has engendered major opposition,
particularly in poor communities of color,270 who do not have
organized election lobbying outfits to make donations, and are
unlikely to welcome many citywide candidates into their homes for
cocktail receptions. Even if public matching funds increase small
donor diversity, issues like homelessness, AIDS funding, and endemic
poverty in fringe neighborhoods of the City will remain subordinate
to the interests of more reliable fundraising sources, or at least
require the advocacy of affluent donors.
Another critique that Leo Glickman, a former CFB attorney who
now advises candidates on election law, has raised is that “one reform
[the New York City system] has not achieved . . . is addressing the
advantages of incumbency, especially at the City Council level.”271 A
year after Glickman’s comments, four Councilmembers lost their
reelection bids, an astonishing level in a city where, as the New York
Times put it, “council members were more likely to lose their seats by
being convicted of a felony than losing an election.”272 The CFB’s
highly regulated system can seem impenetrable to outsiders, and
aspects of the system certainly favor incumbents who can utilize
relationships with political clubs, election lawyers, and the special
interest groups with whom they interact as office holders.
For any supporter of campaign finance reform, however, critiques
of the New York City system pale in comparison to the postregulatory landscape that Citizens United’s unfettered First
Amendment rationale foreshadowed. At a panel on the potential
270. Tina Susman, N.Y. Support for ‘Stop and Frisk’ Split Along Racial Lines in
Poll, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2012, http://articles.latimes.com/2012/aug/16/nation/la-nann-stopandfrisk-20120816.
271. Letter from Leo Glickman, Partner, Stoll, Glickman & Bellina, LLP, to Sue
Ellen Dodell, Gen. Counsel, N.Y.C. Campaign Fin. Bd. (Oct. 24, 2008), available at
http://www.nyccfb.info/PDF/aor/aor-ao-2008-07-lglickman.pdf.
272. Sam Roberts, Voters Reject 3 Council Members Backing Longer Term
Limits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/16/
nyregion/16council.html.
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role of super PACs in the 2013 elections, political operatives warned
that the independent spenders might see the best “return on
investment” from cheap city council races.273 Kevin Finnegan (who
coordinated the payment of Councilmember Palma’s legal fees nearly
a decade ago),274 commented on unions’ interest in cultivating
candidates early in their careers.275 Even the operatives skeptical of a
major infusion of outside spending in the mayoral race believed so
due to the homogeneous or uninspiring composition of the candidate
field, rather than a philosophical or strategic objection.
Thus, reformers should eye New York City’s 2013 elections warily,
as unlimited expenditures may be unleashed on a system that
encourages candidates to restrain their own spending to qualify for
public matching funds. Wealthy individuals, corporations or unions
could swamp a candidate they oppose. Indeed, they have all
demonstrated a propensity to do so before, and do not seem likely to
hesitate to do so again.

273. Reid Pillifant, What Would a Super PAC Want with the 2013 Mayor’s Race
Anyway?, CAPITAL N.Y. (Oct. 22, 2012), http://www.capitalnewyork.com/article/
politics/2012/10/6538533/what-would-super-pac-want-2013-mayors-race-anyway.
274. See supra notes 221–22 and accompanying text.
275. See Pillifant, supra note 273.

